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Chapter 1: Introduction
At the peak of Athenian influence in the fifth century BCE its envoys addressed independent
states in the same terms that the defeated Athens would later describe Rome.1 The course of events that
led to the effective annexation of Athens in 27 BCE illustrates the gradual erosion of Athenian authority
in easy contrast to the ascent of Rome; and yet, the rhetorical evidence that survives for us in the literary
and epigraphic record reveals no such decline.2 Instead, the Athenians defended their identity as an
independent actor and received considerable material benefits from the Romans through the careful
cultivation of their image in the profitable guise of friendship.3 The means of this representation was a
small number of terms that had long held a role in the Pan-Hellenic discourse, and which the Roman
Republic readily adopted after its emergence as a significant actor after 214 BCE.4 A crucial difference
remained, however, in each actor’s treatment of these same terms’ relationship to ideas of jurisdiction;
for, in adopting the language of Hellenistic diplomacy Roman politicians conflated its principle terms
with Latin concepts that apply equally to sovereign and subject states. This dissonance created a space
where the Athenians could benefit in tangible ways from the moral force of these terms, which they
shared with the Romans, while, at the same time, representing themselves as a sovereign state through
language that could mean anything and the opposite to a Roman audience.

1

All translations are my own work unless otherwise noted. The principle terms of analysis in this study are
συμμαχία, φιλία, societas, and amicitia. I will interpret each of these terms at considerable length; however, as
preliminary definitions I will label φιλία (“philia”) and amicitia as friendship, συμμαχία (“symmachia”) as military
alliance, and societas as partnership. Both φιλία and συμμαχία (“ξυμμαχία” in fifth century Attic dialect) feature
prominently in the Thucydidean register: John R. Wilson, “Shifting and Permanent Philia in Thucydides,” Greece
and Rome 36, no. 2 (1989): 147-151.
2
The approximate date of Athens’ incorporation into the Roman Empire is almost impossible to establish.
Considerable portions of Greece fell under the jurisdiction of the Roman governor of Macedonia in 146 BCE, and
the regions excluded from this contributed to the formation of the province of Achaia during Augustus’ provincial
reforms in 29 BCE. Certain cities including Athens retained the title of free cities (“liberae civitates”) throughout the
Roman period, but this title was nominal and did not restrain Roman magistrates from interfering with the internal
politics of free cities almost at will: James H. Oliver, “Roman Emperors and Athens,” Zeitschrift für Alte
Geschichte, Bd. 30 (1981): 413-416.
3
For discussion of discursive norms between Greek states in the Hellenistic age see: John Ma, “Peer Polity
Interaction in the Hellenistic Age,” Past and Present, no. 180 (2003): 23-31.
4
Erich Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (University of California Press, 1984): 60-62.
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From the middle of the second century BCE, Athenian inscriptions frequently describe the
Romans as friends and allies (“φίλοι και σύμμαχοι”) of the Athenian people, and continue to include these
epithets in decrees of state until the conclusion of the first century BCE.5 That these terms endured over
the course of this period is at first surprising in light of the rapid changes that the burgeoning Roman
hegemony affected on the political situation of the Athenians and their state. While the Romans were only
an intermittent participant in the politics of the eastern Mediterranean in the mid-second century, their
involvement increased steadily toward the establishment of direct rule over territories within the vicinity
of Athens. Considering these events, and also the limited flexibility belonging to a minor state such as
Athens, the question arises as to whether the terms friendship and alliance (“φίλοι και σύμμαχοι”) are
accurate descriptors for the Athenians’ relationship with Rome. Generations of scholars have responded
to the negative, taking the view that this language was, from the view of Romans, at its best empty
rhetoric and at its worst part of a broader euphemism that hid the nature of Roman imperialism. The
principle objective of this paper will be to argue to the contrary through an examination of these terms
and their relevance to the diplomatic activities of the Athenian state; for, I shall argue, the Athenians
chose to include the language of friendship and alliance because these words were part of a highly
normative discourse that could and did positively benefit their state in its relationship with Rome.
Such an emphasis on language is also necessary because of this study’s adoption of a theoretical
framework based around International Relations (IR) Constructivism. The basic claim of the
Constructivist school is that the language and ideas that inform the interactions of states are social
constructs. The potency of an idea is not its a priori truth, but that an actor holds it to be true, and that the
use of this idea, reified through use, can have a constitutive effect on the fate of actor and system. This
calls for an especially careful treatment of linguistic evidence in the case of Greco-Roman antiquity
because of the special relationship between our source materials and the internal logic of actors. To return

5

IG II2 1000, IG II2 992, IG II2 977, IG II2 1004, IG II2 1039, IG II2 1042. IG II2 1008 and IG II2 1028. IG II2 1000 is
the first inscription of this type to use the adjective Ῥώμαιοι (“Romans”).
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to an earlier example, we know a fair amount about the actions of Athenian diplomats from the narrative
accounts of Polybius and Livy. These are valuable sources for establishing historical facts and the basic
course of events, but also stand as a medium between us and the actors the historians describe. Because of
this, it is impossible to separate the language of Athenian actors from that of the historian without the
assistance of external sources. Inscriptions are especially suitable for this task because we can say, with
some confidence, that a particular inscription is the product of a specific time and actor. Through the
analysis of this evidence alongside concordant passages from the historians we can develop some idea of
how the Athenian elite represented itself, and how this language helped to shape events.
It was possible for the Athenian elite to conduct this campaign of self-representation with effect
because the language that they used had considerable overlap with the political vocabulary of Latin. The
question of the extent to which Greek and Roman actors shared their discursive norms is a complicated
one but we can say with confidence that each term had a consistent translation in the other language. For
instance, the Ancient Greek word for alliance (“συμμαχία”) translates into Latin as societas.6 We know
this because Livy, writing in Latin, used Polybius’ Greek narrative as a primary source, and those sections
that closely follow Polybius translate συμμαχία as societas. For instance, the forty-second book of Livy
draws upon Polybius to describe the termination of an alliance between the Boeotian cities and the
Kingdom of Macedon. After the Boeotians decided to conclude this pact Livy tells us that “…they
ordered for the exiles to be restored and condemned the authors of the regal societas.”7 The matching
passage of Polybius reports that “…they cast out the men in the party of Neon and Hippias… these were
the men who conducted the policy of συμμαχία.”8 The common feature of these passages is that they both
depict the elimination of the pro-Macedonian faction in Boeotia because of their foreign policies,

6

John Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy Books 41-45. (Oxford University Press, 2012): 1. Briscoe provides an
exhaustive list of incidents in books 41-45 thought to be based on Polybian passages; S. P. Oakley, A Commentary
on Livy Books VI – X. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): 18. Oakley gives a summary of his view that Livy attempted
to closely follow the style and grammatical structure of Polybius.
7
Livy 42.44.1: “…ante omnia exules restitui iusserunt et auctores regiae societatis… damnarunt.”
8
Polybius 27.1.11: “μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νέωνα καὶ τὸν Ἱππίαν ὲξέβαλον, συντρέχοντες ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας
αὐτῶν καὶ κελεύοντες αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀπολογεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν διῳκονομημένων: οὗτοι γὰρ ᾖσαν οἱ τὰ περὶ τὴν
συμμαχίαν οἰκονομήσαντες…”
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respectively called συμμαχία and societas. Because of the close relationship between the texts of Livy and
Polybius, we can safely conclude that these terms refer to each other; however, an important objective of
this study will be to show that this reference falls short of interchangeability.
Instead, I will argue for a bipartite reading of the Greek and Latin conceptions of friendship and
alliance between states. The language of Greco-Roman diplomacy was, in the first place, moral and
bound to powerful social norms. While each culture had terms to describe institutionalized relationships
between states, these appear with far less frequency in treaties and historical documents than moralizing
terms like liberty and friendship. This language appears highly irregular when one considers the brutal
and strongly hierarchical nature of the Greco-Roman state system, but it is a fundamental claim of the
Constructivist thesis for classical antiquity that this language was more than mere euphemism. 9 The
strength of this language was that it established and reified norms that then had concrete effects on the
decisions and outcomes for contemporary actors, and these effects were possible because both Greek and
Roman politicians understood and exploited their normative force. On the other hand, these terms also
encompassed a range of formal meaning that existed only on the Greek side of this exchange. The Roman
Republic, in its advance into the Greek east, forged a network of primarily informal relationships with
Greek states, and the language it equated to Greek diplomatic institutions lacked formal meaning for
them. Previous studies of Greco-Roman international relations have focused on the extent to which this
might have misled or harmed the interests of Greek states.10 This study will instead follow the claim that
no such confusion existed, and that the dissonance between these terms was in fact beneficial to Greek
states: even if they did not possess a formal relationship with Rome, the ability to claim this was
meaningful.

9

Paul J. Burton, Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (Cambridge
University Press, 2011): 19-24.
10
Sara R. Mandell, “Did the Maccabees Believe That They Had a Valid Treaty with Rome?” The Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 53 (1991): 202-220; Arthur M. Eckstein, “Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual
of Unconditional Surrender to Rome: A Realist View,” The International History Review 31 (2009): 253-267.
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The objective of the following chapter will be to situate this discourse in the context of the
ongoing debate between the International Relations (IR) Constructivist and Realist theses for GrecoRoman international relations. In contrast to Constructivism, which emphasizes the “unit level”
characteristics of actors and the constitutive effect of normative language, the Realist school argues that
“system level” factors predicate the decisions of actors and change within the international system.11
According to Realist scholars, the state system is essentially anarchic, and the fear of aggressive action
from other states in the absence of a reliable supranational authority pushes states to engage in “selfhelp.”12 Because of the existential stakes of international politics, the “Realist” state has to view its
neighbors as potentially hostile and from there must itself behave aggressively to forestall threats. With
respect to the modern epoch, the Constructivist critique of this claim is that the Realist state system is,
itself, a reified idea, and that states only act in this manner because they accept the construct of Realism. 13
In recent years, this debate has spilled over into the scholarship on Greco-Roman international relations
through the debate between Arthur Eckstein, an avowed Realist, and the Constructivist scholar Paul
Burton.14 The central point of contention in this debate is the question of whether there existed, in
antiquity, an international institution or cultural habitus that, through its normative force, influenced
actors to behave in a manner distinct from the machtpolitik and fear-based aggression of Eckstein’s
Realist thesis.15 The intent of this study is to show, through the case study of Athens, that informal norms
did shape the Greco-Roman state system and, as Alexander Wendt wrote, “Anarchy is what States make
of it.”16

Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism,”
international Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1995): 142.
12
Keith L. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 54 (1992): 293.
13
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International
Organization, Vol. 48 (1992): 403-407.
14
Arthur M. Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East. From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean,
230-170 BCE (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); Paul J. Burton, Friendship and Empire (2011).
15
Paul J. Burton, “Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Unconditional Surrender to
Rome: A Constructivist View,” The International History Review 31 (2009): 240.
16
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International
Organization, Vol. 48 (1992): 403-407.
11
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The third chapter of this study will begin to describe the “raw materials” that the Athenians used
to represent themselves in their inscriptions and diplomacy through a consideration of the concept of
alliance in the Greco-Roman world.17 This will begin with an analysis of the claim of Holleaux and his
successors that the Roman Republic avoided contracting formal alliances in the Greek east until a period
after its ascent to hegemonic power. It will then proceed to demonstrate that even if the Romans did avoid
the creation of formal pacts, supplying instead the informal societas, they did possess a term for formal
alliance ("foedus”) that they used extensively on the Italian peninsula.18 Per the Latin usage, states that
possessed a foedus had a claim, enshrined in religious sanction, to their partners’ enactment of treaty
rights. From there, the section will conclude with the argument that the word societas encompasses a
range of informal meanings to include temporary contract, social bond, and informal pact. In contrast to
these wholly informal meanings, its Ancient Greek counterpart (“συμμαχία”), which appears frequently in
Athenian inscriptions, was, in effect, an institution of Greek diplomacy and possessed a formal meaning
with consistent parameters. One of the central prerequisites of this institution in its Ancient Greek usage,
as we shall see, is the assumption that only sovereign actors could participate in alliance relations. The
ability to lay claim to this relationship, which remained open because of the Romans’ broad
understanding of συμμαχία as societas, was a powerful tool for Athenians, who could thus claim in their
inscriptions the propagandistic effect of a Roman alliance even if they could not expect Roman arms.
The fourth chapter will continue to analyze the rhetorical potential of the language of Athenian
inscriptions through a consideration of the normative force of international friendship. State and
individual actors in the Greco-Roman world describe their foreign connections as friends with great
regularity in our sources. It is easy to dismiss this language off the cuff because of the self-evident breach
between the hegemonic power politics of antiquity and modern conceptions of equitable friendship. This
study will instead take the view that international friendship is an unstable and inherently unequal

17

I borrow the notion of “raw materials” as an ontological tool from Professor Andrew Latham.
Donald Walter Baronowski, “Roman Treaties with Communities of Citizens,” The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 38
(1988): 177.
18
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relationship based around constant exchanges of service and affirmations of friendship. Friendship in
antiquity, as it does today, rested on normative claims to equality, and even if this was not de facto the
case, the claim that it was allowed lesser states to engage with the Roman power on a stronger footing.
The foundational block of this relationship was the good faith of each party (“fides” in Latin, “πίστις” in
Greek), the preservation of which provided lesser states with considerable leeway for independent action.
The body of the chapter will develop an account of the normative force of international friendship through
a close reading of a number of episodes in the historical register where the fact of past or present
friendship was a determining factor in the outcome of events. It will argue further that this influence
represents a breach in the Realist claim that discursive norms were an irrelevant or aesthetic feature of
Greco-Roman international politics. In fact, they were often the most powerful tool that Greek states had.
The fifth and final chapter of this study will take the concepts developed in the preceding chapters
and apply them to the case study of the relationship between the Athenian and Roman states from its
inception to the termination of Athens as a sovereign state during the provincial reorganization of
Augustus. In doing so, it will argue that the principles of friendship and alliance present in Athenian
inscriptions are typical of the diplomatic behavior that the Athenians used with great success to guide
their state through the period of Rome’s encroachment into the Greek east. Beginning with a discussion of
the textual problems that plague our ability to define the Athenians’ early relationship with Rome, it will
proceed to describe the behavior of the Athenians toward the Romans as their friendship developed from
first contact to mutual benefice. In particular, this section will focus on the extent to which the utility of
each partner flavored their behavior and the outcome of events. It will be argued from this that the
Athenians adherence to this mode of behavior played a substantial role in the success of their state in a
period of the mid-second century BCE when other actors were faltering in their relationship with Rome.
The remainder of the chapter will concern the gradual dissipation of Athenian sovereignty in response to
the Roman imperial encroachment, but will at the same time argue that the Athenians continued to use
political language in concert with cultural norms to tangible effect in their relationship with Rome.
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It was the eventual fate of the Athenian people, as it was for so many others, to fall beneath the
imperial tide of the Roman Republic. By the conclusion of the first century BCE, The Athenians had
suffered four sieges at the hands of Roman commanders, and would, in the words of Appian, participate
in the Roman civil wars out of a desire to “…decide the mastery of the Romans.”19 The road has been
long, and many great states had fallen, but Athens remained: a product of discourse that preserved its
status until the day that it finally, without note or proclamation, slipped into servitude.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical Context: Constructivism and Realism
In the final decades of the second century BCE the Achaean politician and scholar Polybius
began his Histories with the express intent of documenting how, from humble origins, the Roman
Republic had come to dominate the Mediterranean World.20 This same mission has drawn the interest of
scholars since the Renaissance humanists, and from those beginnings has developed in step with theories
of the state and International Relations. In the current century, the influence of Political Science has
become even more pronounced with the deliberate application of modern theories of International
Relations to the Greco-Roman system, beginning with Eckstein’s introduction of International Relations
(IR) Realism in 2009.21 The foundational argument of (IR) Realism is that uncertainty and fear are the
primary motivating factors for actors who, in the absence of any moderating institution, are compelled to
pursue policies of aggressive self-help to ensure their security.22 While Eckstein’s characterization of the
Greco-Roman state system as an anarchic disorder is itself attractive, his treatment of (IR) Realism also
creates a number of problems for the interpretation of historical events through its overemphasis on
system-level factors. According to Realist scholars such as John J. Mearsheimer, the individual

19

Appian, The Civil Wars, 2.70.6: “And the Athenians took to the field, though each side ordered them not to harm
their army, as they were sacred guardians of the gods, but despite this they took pleasure at the expectation of
war, and to decide the mastery of the Romans.”
20
Polybius 1.1.5.
21
Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (University of California
Press, 2009).
22
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (Columbia University Press, 1954): 159.
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characteristics of states are a marginal feature in comparison to the systemic pressures that all states share
as a determinant of behavior.23 If correct, the implication of this claim for the current study would be that
the language the Athenian state used in relation to Roman power had little real world effect, and that
instead they sunk and swam with the vicissitudes of great power politics.
The objective of the current chapter will be to present the argument that (IR) Realism is an
inaccurate model for the description of the Greco-Roman system and to present as an alternative the
competing theory of International Relations (IR) Constructivism. After a brief overview of Realist theory,
I will turn to consider the problems that arise from Eckstein’s application of this model to the ancient
world through a consideration of his narration of Rome’s conflicts in Illyria. In a sense, these problems
are two sides of the same coin, and I will call them now the unitary actor problem. The first half of this
problem is the tendency of Eckstein’s (IR) Realism to conflate the motivations of all state actors such that
they interact with the international system in approximately the same way; the other side of the problem is
that it logically follows that for an actor to engage in unitary behavior it must be composed of pieces that
react to systemic factors with a uniform response. Following an analysis of these features through a
number of historical episodes, the chapter will conclude with a consideration of the substantial benefits of
International Relations (IR) Constructivism as a theoretical model that favors discourse and unit-level
factors.
International Relations (IR) Realism, on the other hand, takes the view that all states exist in a
single anarchic system characterized by chronic insecurity and, as a consequence, competition for
hegemony.24 Its proponents argue further that classical Mediterranean states such as Athens and Rome
existed under the constant threat of aggression from other polities and that in the absence of international
law or a reliable enforcement agency were obliged to view their neighbors with the suspicion of hostile
intent.25 For each state, the achievement of hegemonic power becomes the only reliable security

23

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, 2001): 17.
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Alfred A. Knopf, 1960): 38.
25
Burton, Friendship and Empire, 8-9.
24
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guarantee, and the state system therefore revolves around individual states’ pursuit of this aim, as
Mearsheimer writes:26
The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining
power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of
all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the
hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system… Since no state is likely to achieve
global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition.
Mearsheimer makes a number of assumptions about the nature of the state system in this passage that
make little sense in the content of the ancient world. Perhaps the most significant is the implication in the
above quote that states cohabitate a single system. While the Roman Republic was aware of the Greek
East from an early stage in its existence because of the Greek states of southern Italy, the Romans held no
significant economic or political stake in the East until an advanced stage of their imperial advance.27 The
lack of such a stake, and the Romans’ preoccupation with closer threats, forestalled the apotheosis of a
unified Greco-Roman state system until a later stage.28 Mearsheimer’s second claim, which follows from
the first, is that states will react to systemic pressures and the pursuit of hegemony in a uniform manner.
The systemic application of these claims to the Greco-Roman system forces motivations upon the
state that juxtapose poorly with the overall process of the Roman Republic’s imperial advance. In his
work Rome Enters the Greek East, Arthur M. Eckstein attempted to describe the first fifty years of GrecoRoman engagement through an (IR) Realist theoretical framework.29 Eckstein’s basic contention in this
work was that the Roman Republic experienced the same systemic pressures as Greek states, and that its
reactions were normal in that system.30 He claims further that the rapid ascent of the Roman Republic to
the status of system hegemon was primarily possible because of the collapse of the balance of power

26

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2.
See note 82 on Holleaux.
28
Brian McGing, Polybius’ Histories (Oxford University Press, 2010): 19. McGing remarks that the flow of history
converges into one narrative for Polybius after his recounting of the Council of Naupactus at the end of Book 5. This
event occurred in 217 BCE.
29
Arthur M. Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean
230-170 BC. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
30
Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 9-10.
27
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between the Hellenistic monarchies after the death of Ptolemy IV of Egypt in 204 BCE.31 A benefit of this
form of analysis is that it resists the urge to assign inevitability to the rise of Rome, and instead construes
all states as rational actors attempting to locate and exploit advantage. For example, it is a well-known
point of Roman history that the legions first crossed the Adriatic in 229 BCE because the piratical
ventures of the Ardiaei had escalated to the point of threatening Roman maritime interests.32 Eckstein’s
(IR) Realist account acknowledges this factor, but also points out that the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues
were engaged in warfare with the Ardiaei at the same time. This is because the Ardiaei represented a
broader threat to the stability of the Adriatic region, and their aggression necessitated the reactions of a
number of state-actors on the basis of their individual concerns. Eckstein’s concern for the interactions of
a diverse range of actors, and his aspersion of Roman particularism in this episode, is well taken, but his
account begins to suffer when, in keeping with (IR) Realism, he attempts to describe the behavior of these
actors in terms of their system-level influences.
In his account of the First Illyrian War (229-228 BCE), Eckstein acknowledges that different
immediate causes drove the Roman Senate and the Greek Leagues into conflict with the Ardiaean
Kingdom. The Roman Senate faced the threat of a coherent Illyrian Kingdom emerging opposite the
Italian peninsula and, closer at hand, had to look to the regional trade interests of its south Italian allies.33
The Greek Leagues encountered threats to their territory and spheres of influence from Ardiaean raids
against the Peloponnesus and expansion at the expense of the Kingdom of Epirus. While these threats are
similar in the nature of their vector, they appear in dissimilar contexts. The Greek Leagues, for example,
had to deal with the Ardiaei Kingdom in the context of a wider power struggle with Antigonid Macedon,
and the death throes of the Epirot Kingdom signaled the end of an effective barrier to the incursions of

31

Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 25.
Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 361-364; Graham Shipley, The Greek World After Alexander 323-30 BC.
(Routledge, 2000): 371. Shipley concurs with Gruen that Illyrian piracy had reached an unprecedented pitch with its
attacks on the Aetolian League, but he places an emphasis on the assassination of Roman envoys that Gruen finds
negligible.
33
Polybius 2.8.3; Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 33-36.
32
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aggressive migratory peoples from the continental interior.34 The actions of the Ardiaei were a proximate
cause, therefore, for both the Roman Republic and the Greek Leagues of Aetolia and Achaea; however, a
distinct set of circumstances for each state transformed this first cause into a justification for aggression.
Eckstein, in his account, chooses instead to emphasize system-level influences that he maintains affected
the Roman Republic and Greek Leagues in an essentially uniform manner:35
…strong pressures existed on any powerful state to answer pleas for help positively: refusal to
help might be seen as indicating geopolitical or military weakness- a dangerous step in an
anarchy- as well as a signal to some other power that it could take one’s place in a possibly
significant region… the Roman Senate, in responding to appeals arising from the greatly
intensifying Illyrian attacks, was thus acting and taking risks within the logic of the anarchic
system in which it existed… the Aetolian League and the Achaean League acted similarly…
Eckstein claims that the Roman Republic and the Greek Leagues held an equal concern for asserting their
authority as powerful states in the eastern Mediterranean. According to the “logic of the anarchic system”
to which Eckstein refers, powerful states will intervene in conflict areas to consolidate and confirm their
status as dominant states, and inaction creates the potential for the success of competitors.
The principle problem with a preference for system-level factors in descriptions of the GrecoRoman system is the tendency stemming from this to assign similar characteristics to individual actors.
According to Realist scholars, state-actors, because they share the common goal of hegemony and the fear
of extermination, come to resemble one another from these factors, as Kenneth Waltz writes,
“competition produces a tendency toward sameness of competitors.”36 Whether or not this statement is
true of the information age lies beyond the scope of this study, but its application to Eckstein’s example
of the First Illyrian War is immediately problematic. I share the belief of Classics scholars such as Robert
Morstein-Marx, Erich Gruen, and Maurice Holleaux that the Roman Senate did not commit itself in the

34

Appian, Illyrian Wars 7.2-3; Polybius 2.5.1. Increased raiding concentrated on historical Illyrian targets at Elis
and Messenia in the Peloponnese; in a non-Polybian account, Justin 28.2.14.
35
Eckstein, Roman Enters the Greek East, 38.
36
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley Pub, 1979): 127.
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Greek East until late in the Republican period.37 It is particularly true of the period before the second
century BCE that the Romans simply possessed greater concerns than participation in the Greek East. At
the same time that the Romans first engaged in eastern politics, Hannibal of Carthage threatened the
Italian heartland, and Gallic tribes continued to pose a serious threat in the Po river valley.38 Competition
may produce similarity in competitors, but the Romans had not yet chosen to compete. Instead, the
Roman Senate participated in the Illyrian Crisis on the basis of its unique concerns and, when these had
been resolved, returned to the Italian peninsula without any thought or care for the resulting vacuum.
The nature of the Roman Senate as an actor brings up the second problem with Eckstein’s (IR)
Realist model, which is the tendency to treat the state as a unitary actor. This arises from the necessity of
dismissing the ideological and practical differences of government factions and the individual as
subordinate factors to the self-aggrandizing behavior of the state.39 Imagine, for example, a state that
includes two dominant political factions with opposing foreign policy plans; perhaps one of these plans is
the self-destructive project of a demagogue. Nevertheless, if we say that the primary influence on this
state’s behavior is a cold assessment of its security situation then we will have to plane out these internal
differences in order to create the conditions for a unitary response. This claim is especially difficult to
apply as an attribute to the Roman Senate because of the level of independence that individual Roman
senators had in the creation of foreign policy. After assuming a magistracy, which was itself acquired in
large part through personal and familial authority, there was little incentive for a senator to treat his post
in a manner similar to his predecessor. The life of a Roman politician was an extremely expensive affair,
and, as we see especially in the late Republican period, a tenure as a magistrate in the provinces was often
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the best opportunity to recoup losses while at the same time contributing to his personal reputation.40 This
happened in some cases through the ruinous taxation of provincial populations, but also commonly led to
unprovoked warfare against neighboring peoples. For instance, some scholars believe that M. Licinius
Crassus, living in the first century BCE, desired the governorship of Syria and his subsequent war with
the Parthians because of the mounting inequality of his personal prestige compared to his partners in the
First Triumvirate.41 In the Roman Republic, there was no constitutional check against the interpretation of
Rome’s foreign affairs through the interest of private individuals, and without this it was impossible for
the state to behave as a unitary actor: the self-aggrandizing action of individuals contra the public interest
may well have had a greater influence on Roman history than the unitary self-aggrandizement of the state
itself.
The bottom line of all this is that the (IR) Realist paradigm is unsuitable for the study of GrecoRoman antiquity because it forces a uniformity upon the motivations and disposition of states that is
demonstrably absent. Nevertheless, we can retain some of the attractive features of Realism, such as its
description of the state system as an anarchic disorder, if we consider it through the lens of the competing
theory of International Relations (IR) Constructivism. Alexander Wendt, a prominent Constructivist,
describes Realism as a theory that privileges structure over process. (IR) Constructivism, on the other
hand, maintains that individual states participate in the international system on the basis of meanings and
understandings of relationships that they develop for themselves, as Wendt writes:42
The distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so depends on
the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the “distribution of knowledge,” that
constitutes their conception of self and other.
Constructivism stresses the point that states will begin and develop their relationships with an uneven
balance of knowledge. This balance is uneven because states inform their interactions with one another on
the basis of differing historical and ideological traditions. From this point, the international system itself
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is a social construction based around the imperfect knowledge of its constituent units. The Realist
perspective is inadequate in this regard because of its theoretical reliance on a uniformity of discourse.
This uniformity assumes that the interactions of states within a system will come to mirror one another,
and that this standard discourse will, with time, dominate preexisting systems of meaning. The problem
with this when considering the Greco-Roman world is that state-actors occupied wildly different postings
on the distribution of knowledge. Greeks and Romans possessed varying levels of information about one
another, and drew upon different fields of historical and cultural example when attempting to frame their
behavior to meet new challenges.
The ultimate stake in this project’s adoption of (IR) Constructivism as a theoretical framework is
the relevance of the individual characteristics of a small state such as Athens to the creation of tangible
political realities. Throughout their involvement with agents of the Roman Republic, the Athenians
engaged in a consistent program of diplomacy that held as its apparent object the cultivation of their state,
in the eyes of the Romans, as a friend and partner in the often volatile conditions of the East. The
effectiveness of this effort assumes the ability of language to influence actors to make decisions that
exceed or contradict the behavior that we would expect from them if solely concerned with preservation.
The objective of the chapters to come will be to show precisely this.

Chapter 3 – Greek and Roman Concepts of Alliance and Obligation
When the Romans first began to participate in the politics of the Greek East at the conclusion of
the third century BCE, they entered a state system vastly different from that of their Italian experience. In
contrast to the unchallenged supremacy of Rome on the Italian peninsula, a diverse collection of polities
controlled the levers of power in the eastern Mediterranean basin. The chief characteristic of the system
that emerged from this distribution of power was the endemic warfare that marks the Hellenistic Age as a
near perfect exemplar of the anarchic disorder; however, the simultaneous development of sophisticated
diplomatic procedures forestalls this title. During this period, the diplomats and politicians of Greek states
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made use of a diplomatic language that possessed a high degree of normative meaning and that could,
when properly employed, moderate the violent conditions of the time. When the Romans arrived in the
Greek East, they understood the language of Greek political actors through the lens of parallel terms in
the Latin language, and on the short term this condition was beneficial to both Greek and Roman. In the
Greek language, the word for alliance (“συμμαχία”) was a technical category for a relationship of mutual
obligation between two actors that possessed at least internal sovereignty. While there did exist a term for
treaty (“foedus”) in the Latin language, the Romans instead used the word for partnership (“societas”) to
translate the Greek term for alliance (“συμμαχία”).43 This distinction benefitted Greek actors because they
were able to make use of the propagandistic value of naming themselves a Roman ally even if they lacked
the formal grant of a treaty (“foedus”). At the same time, Romans were able to benefit from the normative
expectations of alliance (“συμμαχία”) without taking on real obligations to foreign powers.
The objective of the current chapter is to summarize the distinction between Greek and Roman
conceptions of alliance and, in doing so, to begin to explain the utility of the word alliance (“συμμαχία”)
as a motif of Athenian inscriptions. I will make this argument through an analysis of the literary use of
each term, and will, wherever possible, confirm the definitions that I reach with reference to secondary
authors. The first section of this analysis will deal with the Greek term for alliance (“συμμαχία”), and will
seek to define the term as a technical descriptor that assigns definite obligations to the contracting parties.
After that, I will argue that while the term is often applied to relationships between unequal actors, it is a
fundamental characteristic of alliance (“συμμαχία”) that each party retain its own internal sovereignty. In
contrast to these features, the Latin term for partnership (“societas”) describes informal relationships such
as the moral bond of political confederates and the social contract between citizens. The common feature
of all partnerships (“societates”), as I shall argue through a review of the primary source record, is that
they are essentially a moral institution, and therefore only persist as long as the good faith of either party.
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After this, I will then conclude with a consideration of the utility of alliance (“συμμαχία”) for the
Athenians, and will argue that the discontinuity of this term with the Latin created more opportunity than
detriment.
Perhaps the most sophisticated discussion of the alliance (“συμμαχία”) to appear in an ancient
author is that which accompanies Thucydides’ narration of the events preceding the Peloponnesian War.
At this juncture, Thucydides tells us that the Athenian assembly has convened to discuss the possibility of
beginning a formal diplomatic relationship with the island of Corcyra. The immediate issue that faces the
assembled Athenians is that the Corcyrans hope to begin a very particular relationship, the alliance
(“συμμαχία”), which would oblige them to engage in warfare with Corcyra’s enemies.44 This is a request
with far-reaching implications for the Athenians, as at that time the Corcyrans were engaged in a
protracted struggle with Corinth, itself a member of the Peloponnesian League.45 Because of this, the
Athenians of Thucydides’ account have to weigh the fact that an alliance (“συμμαχία”) could provoke a
more serious struggle with Sparta and the states of the Peloponnese. This was too great a risk for the
Athenians, who chose instead to join themselves to Corcyra in a strictly defensive alliance (“ἐπιμαχία”).46
By placing this decision in the mouth of his characters, Thucydides provides the reader with a negative
definition of the full alliance (“συμμαχία”): it is a form of military alliance that creates a binding and
reciprocal obligation between two actors to participate in offensive and defensive. The final form of this
relationship is a connection so close that, as Thucydides wrote, the contracting states “…reckon the same
friends and enemies.”47 It is clear, therefore, that the alliance (“συμμαχία”) of Thucydides’ day in the fifth
century BCE was a diplomatic relationship with the technical implication of creating obligation between
actors; however, it remains to be seen whether this definition stood the test of time.
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There is good reason to think that Greek actors would have developed a cynical view of the
alliance (“συμμαχία”) as an instrument for the control of lesser regional actors in the Hellenistic period.
After Philip III of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, defeated a confederation of free Greek states
including the Athenians at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, he compelled the defeated to join the
League of Corinth.48 The purpose of the League of Corinth was, in effect, to serve an administrative role
in the establishment of a Macedonian hegemony over Greece proper. It accomplished this through the
prescription of a number of obligations to each member state, as Diodorus wrote: “…Philip set the
number of soldiers for each city to contribute to the alliance (“συμμαχία”), and returned to Macedonia.”49
The immediate distinction between the sort of alliance enshrined in the League of Corinth and that
contemplated between the Athenians and the Corcyrans is the status of the actors. Unlike the Thucydidean
scenario, the member states of the League of Corinth were clear subjects to the Macedonian crown;
however, I will argue that a crucial attribute underpinning the ability of these states to participate in
alliance (“συμμαχία”) is the fact that they retained some measure of internal sovereignty.
It was often the case in the ancient world that vast discrepancies existed between the relative
power of alliance partners, but even the most marginal states were able to benefit from institutions of
diplomacy such as the alliance provided that they maintained this internal sovereignty. The geographer
Strabo provides an important example of the standards for this status when he pauses in his description of
Anatolia to discuss the history of a confederation of Lycian-Greek cities. According to Strabo, these cities
had previously conducted an independent foreign policy, but had ceased to do so under the Romans:
In earlier times [the Lycian assembly] would deliberate about war and peace and alliance
(“συμμαχίας”), but now they naturally do not do so, since these matters necessarily lie in the
power of the Romans, except, perhaps, when the Romans should give them permission or it
should be for their benefit.50
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The decision on the part of the Lycian-Greeks to discontinue an independent foreign policy had nothing to
do with the fact that the Romans were a greater power, but instead relates to the capacity of those cities to
pass the final judgment on their own affairs. When this ability was delegated to the Romans, the status of
the Lycian state fell below the necessary threshold to conduct diplomatic activities such as the alliance. It
might appear at first that this befell the Lycians merely because a more powerful state engulfed them, but
Strabo makes it clear in a later episode that institutions such as the alliance prevented this. According to
Strabo, the Romans refused to intervene in the internal affairs of Cappadocia because they had a preexisting alliance.51 The Cappadocians were, of course, a marginal actor in contemporary politics, but
Strabo maintains that their state’s capacity to maintain the institution of alliance excluded Roman
interference. After taking all of this into account, we can again establish a definition of the alliance
(“συμμαχία”) as a technical institution of Greek diplomacy that was predicated upon the internal
sovereignty of either actor.
In addition to this, the Greek alliance (“συμμαχία”) also established a sense of obligation between
partners that ran in both directions and existed regardless of their relative power or authority. Diodorus
provides an example of exactly this in his narration of Alexander the Great’s eastern campaigns, when he
writes that “…Alexander forced Sasibisare to carry out his orders after he struck down the King, who was
found wanting in his alliance (“συμμαχία”) with Porus.”52 It is interesting to note that the alliance in this
passage exists as a relationship between two clients of the hegemon, Alexander the Great. The fact that
Alexander’s power outstrips that of Sasibisare and Porus is itself insignificant in this episode. What does
matter is that Sasibisare was unable to fulfill his obligation to Porus, an obligation that could only exist
because he was responsible for his actions and therefore able to participate in alliance (“συμμαχία”).
As we saw in Thucydides’ description of the Athenians’ defensive alliance with Corcyra, the
possibility that an alliance (“συμμαχία”) could create undesired obligations to other actors was both an

51

Strabo 12.1.11.
Diodorus 17.90.4: “ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος τὸν ὑστερηκότα τῆς τοῦ Πώρου συμμαχίας βασιλέα ὄνομα Σασιβισάρην
καταπληξάμενος ἠνάγκασε ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον…”
52

N o r t h | 20
integral feature of the alliance and a substantial concern for contracting parties. This same concern arises
in the Greek historian and biographer Plutarch’s description of Cato the Elder’s campaigns against the
native peoples of Spain. Before he ascended to his greatest celebrity as a senior statesmen, Cato served
for a term as governor of the consular province of Hispania Citerior.53 Now, the three provinces of
Hispania were, and would be for some time, the scene of considerable local resistance to Roman rule, and
Cato’s consulship was unexceptional in this regard.54 According to Plutarch, a tribal group from the
uncontrolled interior invaded Cato’s province soon after his arrival in the region, and facing this threat
with limited resources he chose to enter an alliance (“συμμαχία”) with a local Celtiberian tribe to prevent
the utter destruction of his garrison.55 In Plutarch’s account, the immediate concern of Cato’s
subordinates, upon hearing that he intends to enter this pact, is that it will create an inconvenient
obligation for the Romans after their victory. Plutarch has Cato, answering this concern, state that
“…there was nothing terrible in it; should they be victorious, they could pay the price with the spoils
taken from the enemy, and not out of their own purse. Whereas, should they fall, there would be nobody
left either to pay or ask the price.”56 Plutarch’s Cato confirms that his creation of an alliance has created
an obligation to benefit the Celtiberians, and he is only able to deflect the concern that this provokes for
his subordinates by pointing out that, in any case, the problem isn’t theirs to deal with.
Plutarch is a late source, but this episode emphasizes some of the continuities that persisted in the
meaning of alliance (“συμμαχία”) to a Greek audience through the period under consideration in this
study and beyond. As we saw at the beginning of this section with Athens and Corcyra, the alliance was a
relationship with technical parameters and a set sense of obligation, and it was this same set of attributes
that informed the behavior of Cato’s subordinates in Plutarch’s account. It is clear, furthermore, that the
Celtiberians exist in some sense outside of the capacity of Roman governance to compel their assistance
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even in a time of the greatest necessity. This is because the Celtiberians were de facto an independent
people, and it was this independence, as we saw also with the Lycian-Greeks, that made the alliance an
appropriate description of their behavior for a Greek historian such as Plutarch. For all these reasons, the
alliance (“συμμαχία”) was a powerful idea in the eyes of a Greek audience. It was unclear in the case of
Rome whether the obligations that the word stood for would come to fruition, but the idea that they might
was rooted in the word and becomes a factor in and of itself.
In fact, the Romans felt no obligations to the states that they joined in alliance (“συμμαχία”)
because they understood this term in translation through their own concept of partnership (“societas”). In
contrast to the Greek alliance, the partnership was an informal connection that described connections such
as the precarious allegiance of political allies and also the most malleable form of contract in Roman law.
This preliminary definition corresponds to a general reevaluation of the term that began with the labors of
the scholars behind the monumental Thesaurus Lingua Latinae. Prior to this revision, scholars generally
understood the word societas, which I have translated as partnership, to share an etymology with the verb
sequi, which means “to follow.”57 If that had been a correct etymology, it would have fit comfortably with
the popular conception of the most famous societas, that between Rome and its Italian clients; however, it
would have been less comfortable as a descriptor for the second triumvirate in Suetonius.58 The revised
account of the Thesaurus Lingua Latinae shifts this etymology of the term from the root “to follow” to a
separate proto-Indo-European stem meaning “friend.” This shifts the assertion of Suetonius’ that a
partnership (“societas”) existed between the triumvirs from uncertain hierarchy to informal pact, and also,
as I shall now argue, agrees with the use of the word in the historical record more generally.
The common appearance of the word partnership (“societas”) as a description of the relationship
between actors in Livy’s historical works of the first century BCE has contributed a great deal to the view
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that it signifies a formal relationship such as the Greek alliance (“συμμαχία”); however, the term’s earliest
appearance in the corpus points instead to its quality as a status preliminary to such a formal connection.
This appearance occurs during Livy’s narration of the events surrounding the legendary foundation of
Rome in 753 BCE when, according to the historian, an eclectic band of vagrants and herdsmen were the
sole inhabitants of the city itself. While in other respects their future prospects seemed promising, the
Romans faced a significant demographic problem in the complete lack of a female population:
Already the Roman community was so vibrant that it was the equal in warfare to any of the
neighboring states, but a great scarcity of women was about to leave barren a generation of men,
for whom there was neither the hope of a household nor the union of offspring with the
neighboring peoples. From this, and with the council of the fathers, Romulus sent envoys all
around to the neighboring peoples, so that they might seek out partnership (“societatem”) and
intermarriage (“conubium”) with a new people.59
The use of the word intermarriage (“conubium”) alongside partnership in this passage sheds some light on
the significance of partnership in Livy’s narration. According to Gaius, the word “conubium” refers to a
status where “… [it] comes about that children follow the condition of the father.”60 The interest of Livy’s
Romans in this passage is, therefore, the creation of a partnership for the sake of their posterity, but the
events to follow discourage us from completely disassociating partnership from more formal processes. In
a famous episode, the Romans, rebuffed in their previous effort to secure wives, steal them from the
neighboring Sabines.61 After a violent confrontation between the men of each community, the realization
that the nuptials and pregnancies of the kidnapped women have already merged their communities leads
to the creation of a more formal connection, but this is not the partnership (“societas”) first pursued.
Instead, the Romans and the Sabines create a treaty (“foedus”), which we shall encounter repeatedly in
this study as a more approximate analog to the alliance (“συμμαχία”) than the informal partnership.
For a Roman audience, the treaty (“foedus”) represented precisely the formal qualities that were
lacking in the partnership. As Gladhill has argued in a recent work, the concept of the treaty (“foedus”)
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fulfilled a substantial role in the Roman imagination toward the connections that underpinned compacts
ranging from those between political actors to the physical ties that drive the cosmic order.62 As a political
act, the treaty (“foedus”) began for Romans when Jupiter provided his sanction through the ceremonial
rites of the fetial priests.63 This origin instilled a reverence for the particular responsibilities that each
treaty (“foedus”) described, and the Romans felt, as a matter of course, that it was their obligation to
observe these sanctions out of a sense of religious dread. That this created such a sense of obligation in
the international space becomes clear in an episode from the later historian Eutropius, who describes the
events that followed from the commander Mancinus’ creation of an undesirable treaty:64
…Hostilius Mancinus, consul for the second time, made an infamous peace with the
Numantines, which the people and Senate ordered to be broken, and they also ordered that
Mancinus himself be handed over to the enemy, so that in his person, which they reckoned the
author of the treaty (“foederis”), they might vindicate the slight of a broken treaty (“foederis”).
According to Eutropius, C. Hostilius Mancinus created a treaty (“foedus”) that contradicted the intent of
the Roman Senate in their dealings with the Numantines, but the senators were unable to simply disregard
the treaty because of the solemnity of that compact: they instead attempt to circumvent the problem. This
implicitly confirms the reading that the creation of a treaty (“foedus”) established inviolable obligations
when Eutropius tells us that the senatorial fathers chose the extreme course of abrogating responsibility
away from the Roman Republic to the person of Mancinus. With respect to the previous episode
concerning the Sabine women, it becomes clear that the creation of a treaty (“foedus”) represented an
escalation in that relationship to a level of formal obligation missing in the partnership (“societas”).
Other descriptions of partnership (“societas”) in Livy confirm its preliminary character while also
reinforcing the term’s definition as an informal connection. The creation of a pact between the Romans
and the Numidian King Syphax found in the twenty-fourth book of Livy is one example of this. At this
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juncture, the Romans hope to secure an agreement for Syphax to sustain his current conflict with the
Carthaginians. When the Roman legation offers the creation of a diplomatic compact to Syphax, Livy
describes this relationship as a friendship and partnership (“amicitiam societatemque”).65 After some
consideration, Syphax determines to reject this initial proposal, and instead demands to swear a formal
oath in the presence of the Romans’ commander.66 This first proposal to enter a partnership (“societas”)
was insufficient for Syphax because it provided too little assurance that the Romans would provide him
with support, and instead he wants to enter into a relationship that Livy calls a treaty (“foedus”).67 It is
possible that the Romans mislead the Numidian King in this instance, as Livy tells us that Syphax
received nothing from this treaty “…beyond the name.”68 There are a number of possible explanations for
this. As we saw in the case of C. Hostilius Mancinus, the Roman Senate displayed little hesitation in
disassociating itself from the undesirable actions of its magistrates. It is also possible that the Romans
were able to avoid the fulfillment of their obligations indefinitely provided that they did not deny them as
Rome’s relationship with the Numantines demanded. In any case, Livy makes it clear that the preliminary
offer of friendship and partnership (“amicitiam societatemque”) was too weak for Syphax, and suggests in
his narration that it was reasonable to assume a stronger relationship in the institution of the treaty.
The Roman legal tradition also depicts the partnership (“societas”) as a weak and variable
instrument. At the time that Gaius wrote his legal commentaries in the first century CE there were three
forms of contract enshrined in Roman law, those being emptio venditio, locatio conductio, and societas.
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Out of these, the partnership was the most temporary in length and the most malleable in its restrictions,
as Gaius wrote: “…partnership (“societas”) persists up to this point; that is, so long as [the partners] had
continued in the same sense; but at such a time when someone will have renounced the partnership, it is
dissolved.”69 Romans who participated in a legal partnership could abandon this relationship at any point.
Gaius does provide the single provision that a Roman could not conclude a partnership in order to alienate
his partner from the profits of their mutual labor, but this is a narrow cordon indeed. Gaius’ description of
the legal partnership (“societas”) emphasizes its nature as a temporary contract subject to rapid changes
of condition. Unlike the treaty (“foedus”), which in some instances bound parties to its sanctions
regardless of their interests, the partnership (“societas”) was a far more flexible instrument.
In addition to its application to international politics and legal contracts, Roman authors also used
the informal breadth of partnership (“societas”) to describe the social bond between friends and family.
The historian Florus, writing in the second century CE during the reign of Hadrian, emphasizes this
informality and a corresponding preference for the word treaty (“foedus”) when describing formal
relationships. Florus uses the word partnership four times throughout his brief rendition of Roman
history, and when he does so it is always to describe a temporary relationship of little obligation, such as
that which existed between the members of the first triumvirate:
…at a time when each man was advancing in his own glory with shared resources, Caesar
invaded Gaul, Crassus invaded Asia, and Pompey invaded Spain; three great armies, and in
these the power of the world was held in the partnership (“societate”) of the three leading men.
That deplorable domination dragged on for ten years due to their reliance, and because they
were possessed of mutual fear.70
The relationship that existed between the triumvirs was a partnership, and, according to Florus, this was a
volatile association. As only the precarious bonds of fear and necessity drew the triumvirs into alignment,
their relationship was weak and prone to rupture. Since there was no legal obligation between the
triumvirs, Florus is able to appropriately describe it as the most informal of relationships: the partnership.
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Following the death of Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BCE, the partnership between Pompeius Magnus
and Julius Caesar fell under mounting pressure as the prerogatives of each man drove them to conflict.
According to Florus, the only thing that could still contain this impending breach was the marriage of
Pompeius to Caesar’s daughter: “… [Julia], bride to Pompeius, was preserving the concord of father-inlaw and son-in-law through the treaty (“foederis”) of marriage.”71 When Julia soon died in child birth, this
eliminated the obligations and expectations of the marriage treaty between her father and husband. As we
know from the earlier passage, a partnership (“societas”) existed between Pompeius Magnus and Caesar,
but that relationship alone lacked the force to preserve the peace. A similar association appears when
Florus describes the rationale of Octavian Augustus for entering the second triumvirate with the remark
“…it was necessary to come into the partnership (“societatem”) of the cruelest treaty (“foederis”).72 In
this instance, partnership describes the overarching relationship that the binding treaty exists within.
Overall, the word treaty (“foedus”) appears thirty-four times in Florus, and when that author wishes to
describe formal compacts and treaties between states it is without question to this word that he turns.
The distinction between the treaty (“foedus”) and the partnership (“societas”) lies in the degree of
obligation that each concept implies for the contracting parties. As we saw with the concerns of Syphax
and the legal commentary of Gaius, partnership was, for a Roman audience, a relationship that exacted
loose and often ill-defined obligations on partners. In contrast, the treaty (“foedus”) bound two or more
parties to an expressed set of obligations that could play a substantial role in informing their decisions and
capacity for action. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that the Romans almost never described their
connections with Greek states as treaties. Indeed, it would seem that the treaty (“foedus”) was a closer
approximation to the expectations of the Greek alliance (“συμμαχία”) than the concept of partnership, and
yet it is partnership (“societas”) that the Romans used as a corollary to Greek alliance in translation. The
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precise rationale for this misnomer has been the subject of endless debate, and is ultimately unanswerable,
but we can discuss with greater confidence the effect that this had on the discourse of Hellenistic states.
According to I Maccabees, the Jewish people under their leader Judas Maccabee entered into an
alliance (“συμμαχία”) with the Romans in the midst of a rebellion against their overlord Antiochus IV.73
The author of I Maccabees provides the reason for this decision as the fact that “…Judas heard…
whoever entered friendship (“φιλία”) with [the Romans] stood with them, and also because they were
powerful.”74 The fidelity that the Romans have demonstrated to their friends and allies in the past also
receives emphasis with the remark that “… [the Romans] preserved friendship with their allies and those
who were taking security among them… whoever heard their name was fearing them.”75 Now, it seems
doubtful that the nascent Jewish state, locked in an existential struggle with Antiochus IV Epiphanes,
could expect to receive material assistance from the Roman Republic. Some time ago, Sara Mandell
posed the question “Did the Maccabees believe that they had a valid treaty with Rome?”76 Mandell’s
conclusion was that they did believe this because of the mistaken assumption that their alliance
(“συμμαχία”) was equivalent to the Roman alliance (“foedus”), when in fact they possessed only an
informal partnership (“societas”).77 This claim that the Maccabees failed to grasp the language of Roman
diplomacy at such a fundamental level is unnecessary. Mandell’s argument falls into the trap of assuming
that the Maccabees considered a Roman alliance important because of the realization of what it signifies,
the arrival of Roman legions, instead of the capacity of language to benefit the Maccabees in and of itself.
This latter message is, in fact, the one that carries through the text, which devotes considerable space to
describing the psychological effect of Roman power without any mention of the physical benefits of
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alliance.78 The situation was dire, and the Maccabees had learned that in a volatile world the idea of a
Roman alliance could be the strongest deterrent to the aggression of the Seleucid monarchy.
One of the exceptional features of the Athenians at the start of the second century BCE is that
they demonstrated an understanding of the practical benefits of this exact idea from an early stage. The
Athenians, as we shall see in chapter 5, almost certainly lacked a formal treaty (“foedus”) with Rome
throughout the period under consideration. Nevertheless, the Athenians erected dozens of monuments
over the course of the century preceding their incorporation into the province of Achaia (27 BCE) that
described their alliance (“συμμαχία”) with the Romans. For a Greek audience, this term implied a formal
connection between Athens and Rome and the assurance that the Romans would ensure the security of the
lesser state. This was not the case for the Romans, who would have interpreted this relationship through
the concept of informal partnership (“societas”); however, the distinction benefitted both parties. The
Athenians were able to claim the idea of Roman alliance and everything that this implied for their
strategic situation while, at the same time, the Romans were able to nurture a friendship with the
Athenians while still maintaining a noncommittal policy toward the Greek East. It was in this way, with
the appearance of benefit for all, that the first seeds of subjugation swept east.
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Chapter 4: Greek and Roman International Friendship
In recent years, the concept of “friendship” has undergone considerable reassessment as a
structural component of both interpersonal and interstate relationship in antiquity.79 The terms for
friendship, amicitia and φιλία, are among the most frequent descriptors of Greco-Roman interstate
relationships; however, scholars have tended in the past to dismiss the importance of the term on the basis
of legalistic readings of the source materials.80 This view follows the assumption that friendship is an
equal affair and, as such, its appearance as a connection between unequal states such as the Roman
Republic and Athens comes to resemble a transparent euphemism. It was, as Burton writes, for this reason
that early theorists of Greco-Roman International Relations landed upon clientship as a “more precise
social analogue than [friendship].”81 The immediate error of this choice lies with its preference for the
perceived accuracy of a term in the eyes of modern scholars over the efficacy of language itself. Despite
the evident disparity between the highly asymmetrical Mediterranean state system and the ideal of
friendship as an equal relationship, the latter, as we shall see, persisted as a norm of interstate relations at
least until the end of the period under consideration. This had little to do with any misconceptions about
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the balance of power relations, but instead reflects the capacity of the language of friendship to affect
actors and the overall course of events.
The objective of the present chapter will be the twofold task of developing the concept of
international friendship with due attention to ongoing debates in the scholarship while also conducting a
systematic review of amicitia and φιλία as they appear in our sources. As we shall see, a fundamental
component of the friendship of Greco-Roman states is the employment of gift-exchange and
misrecognition strategies to preserve the appearance of equality. This dynamic was necessary because of
an inherent tension between the utility of friendship and claims to equality between friends. The
enactment of this discourse was desirable, in the end, because it allowed the lesser party to accrue
concrete benefits under the guise of equality while the senior partner, the Roman Republic, was able to
maintain its leading position in the Mediterranean state system without accumulating obligations.82 The
first section of this chapter will consider the connection between friendship and obligation through a brief
consideration of the Latin concept of fides (“good faith”), and from there will turn to the subject of gift
exchange as a diplomatic strategy and bulwark of Greco-Roman friendship. This will lead to the body of
the present chapter, which will consider distinctions between Greek and Roman conceptions of friendship
through an analysis of friendship language in their respective historiographic traditions. In doing so, I
shall argue that while, in the first place, Greek and Roman authors shared a notion of equal interstate
friendship, the Roman variant ultimately militates toward an asymmetry absent in the Greek.
In making this argument I will frequently refer to definitions and examples drawn from the
philosophical works of Cicero and Seneca. This may appear problematic at first, for it seems plausible
that friendship as an institution of international relations could evolve on a trajectory distinct from the
literary tradition of the elite; however, there exists an intrinsic connection between interpersonal and
interstate friendship in the Roman tradition. Throughout the Republican period, the Roman government
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maintained a number of lists enumerating its foreign contacts entitled the formula ameicorum (“list of
friends”).83 Our knowledge of the precise identity of this register remains complicated as a result of the
paucity of evidence and the ongoing dispute as to whether it was distinct from other registers, such as the
formula sociorum, but what we can say without controversy is telling.84 In the year 78 BCE, during the
consulship of Q. Lutatius Catulus and M. Aemelius Lepidus, the Roman Senate issued a decree
conferring the title of amici (“friends”) on three Greek naval officers through their enrollment in
ameicorum formula.85 The historian Appian claims that six years earlier, in 84 BCE, the Roman general
L. Cornelius Sulla inscribed (“ἀνέγραφε”) the peoples of Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Rhodes and Magnesia as
friends of the Roman people.86 This is almost certainly the same register that bore the names of the Greek
officers, which means that the list treated together the friendship of both men and states.87
It is with good reason, therefore, that we can proceed with the understanding that there was, for a
Roman audience, an innate connection between the amicitiae of individuals and that of states. The
essence of this nomenclature was, in the words of Erich Gruen, “a description of the relationship, not a
tool which allowed Rome to make claims or lay obligations.”88 It is axiomatic of friendship, furthermore,
that its only foundation is the good faith of each partner, as Cicero wrote: “…good faith, moreover, is the
foundation of the stability and constancy which we seek in friendship; for, nothing is stable which is
faithless.”89 Friendship, whether of the international or interpersonal variety, begins with a leap of faith on
the part of each potential friend. The creation of true intimacy mandates the exposure of a level of the self
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that is vulnerable in the most basic sense, and the only obstacle to the exploitation of this vulnerability is,
indeed, the fides of the opposite party. Roman conventions governing the inception of one form of
international friendship mirror this procedure.90 In circumstances when a sovereign state surrenders itself
to representatives of the Roman Republic, our sources frequently describe the act as entering in fidem
populi Romani.91 The significance of this act was that the surrendering state placed itself completely at the
mercy of the other party, which was expected to dispense a fair judgment in response.92
The abortive surrender of the Aetolian League to the Roman consul M.’ Acilius Glabrio in 191
BCE is the locus classicus for the assumption of absolute control through surrender in fidem. At this
juncture, the Aetolian League had embarked upon a disastrous war with the Roman Republic alongside
the Seleucid Empire.93 The relationship between the Aetolian League and the Roman Republic began in
211 BCE, when the two parties formalized a foedus (“treaty”) in the interest of together opposing their
mutual enemy, Philip V of Macedon.94 Over the course of the succeeding years, this bond survived a
number of challenges, not least of which was the Aetolians’ violation of the Roman foedus through their
pursuit of a unilateral peace agreement with Philip V in 205 BCE.95 The true break occurred, however, in
the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War (200-197 BCE), when the Romans elected to retain the
“fetters of Greece,” the fortress cities of Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias.96 This factor, alongside the

90

Burton, Friendship and Empire, 79. Burton divides the paths for the inception of international friendship into
those formed through (1) military cooperation, (2) diplomacy, (3) voluntary surrender, and (4) surrender under
duress. The latter routes are both forms of deditio; these largely correspond to the categories of Gruen, who
described the international friendships of Rome as beginning through military cooperation or the cessation of
hostilities, see: Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 86.
91
Examples include the surrender of Jerusalem to Pompey Magnus (Eutropius 6.14.9), Nabis of Sparta’s surrender
to the consul T. Quinctius (Livy 34.35), and the voluntary surrender of the Remi to Caesar (The Gallic Wars, 2.3.2).
92
Paul J. Burton, “Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman
Republic: A Constructivist View,” The International History Review 31 (2009): 245.
93
Arthur M. Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations 264-194
B.C., (University of California Press, 1987): 313-315.
94
Badian argues for a date in the Autumn of 211 BCE: Ernst Badian, “Aetolica,” Latomus T. 17 (1958): 203.
95
Livy 29.12.1; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, “Rome and Macedon, 205-200 B.C.,” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 44
(1954): 31.
96
Polybius 18.45.5-6; the “fetters of Greece” were the most significant fortresses in the network of garrisons that the
Antigonids had maintained in southern Greece since the early decades of the third century BCE. The utility of these
sites was that their geographical distribution allowed the Antigonids to control access and communications into and
throughout Greece at the relatively token cost of maintaining mercenary troops, see: Winthrop Lindsay Adams,
“Alexander’s Successors to 221 BC,” in A Companion to Ancient Macedon, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 221.

N o r t h | 33
failure of the Aetolians to satisfy their goals for territorial acquisitions in the preceding conflict, led their
leadership to an alliance with the Seleucid Empire in coalition against the Roman Republic.97 The
Seleucid dynast, Antiochus III, failed to live up to the expectations of the Aetolians, who soon found
themselves in the position of seeking a conclusion to hostilities.98 In the Livian account, the leader of the
subsequent Aetolian legation consigns the fate of his state to the Roman Republic, stating that “…the
Aetolians hand over themselves and all their affairs to the faith of the Roman people.”99 The response of
the Roman envoy, “…consider most carefully, Aetolians, that you would surrender thus,” foreshadows
the significance of the surrender in fidem for a Roman audience: it is more than rhetoric, and indicates the
placement of the subordinate party fully at the mercy of the conqueror.100 As we shall see in the Greek
sections of the analysis, moralizing language will often accompany the Hellenistic diplomatic vocabulary;
however, this seems to have lacked an immediate connection with the power dynamic of two parties as, in
fact, Livy places in the mouth of the Greek spokesman when the enactment of Roman good faith lands
him in chains: “…we handed ourselves over into your faith, and not into slavery.”101
The episode considered above concludes with the relegation of the Aetolian peoples to the
position, uncommon for this period, of unambiguous subordination to the Roman Republic, but this does
not seem to have been the norm. According to Eutropius, the Roman invasion of Sicily in 263 BCE
provoked the preemptive surrender of fifty-two cities, which were received into the good faith of Rome
(“in fidem acceptae”).102 The ramifications of this surrender for the sovereignty of these cities remain a
point of controversy. According to Cicero, less than ten Sicilian city-states possessed formal relations
with the Roman Republic in the first century BCE, as he writes: “There are two states with treaties…
Mamertina and Tauromena, beyond these there are five states, free and immune from taxation, without

97

The Aetolian League sought the control of a number of cities in Thessaly, see: Walbank, The Hellenistic World,
237; the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 211 BCE guaranteed for the Aetolians the ownership of any captured cities.
98
Livy 36.27.1.
99
Livy 36.28.1.
100
Livy 36.28.2.
101
Livy 36.28.3
102
Eutropius 2.19.2; Diodorus 23.4.1 lists the number of cities at sixty-seven; Burton, Friendship and Empire, 142.

N o r t h | 34
treaties.”103 For Badian, this was a principle argument for the moral basis of Roman international contact
as an expansion of the domestic institution of the client-patron relationship.104 However, as Burton has
pointed out, this assessment fails to account for the language of our sources, which overwhelmingly
employ the language of friendship to describe the Roman Republic’s extra-legal relationships with
foreign states.105 Cicero, speaking of the fate of the Sicilian city-states in his Second Verrines, states
“…and so we accepted the Sicilian states into friendship and good faith with the result that they were in
possession of the same law to which they had been accustomed, that is, in the same condition.”106 Instead
of taking on the status of Roman clients, one of abject subordination in the Roman imagination, the
Sicilian city-states pass from surrender to the privileged status of friendship.107
It is easy to understand why Badian saw something of the client in the institution of international
friendship if, following a commendable instinct, we find it difficult to call friendship an unequal game;
however, it is the sobering truth that international friendship is unable to perpetuate without inequity.
When two friends engage with one another, there is always a temporal lag between the provision of
kindness or favors on the part of one friend and reciprocation from the other. This dynamic creates a state
of affairs where one friend stands in a position of moral superiority, as Burton writes: “…asymmetries
can never be smoothed out of friendship: at any given point… one friend is always in the position of
having (over)benefitted the other, while the other is… in the subordinate position of having to
reciprocate.”108 This paradigm allows us to shed some light on a number of instances in Greco-Roman
history when friends of the Roman Republic were able to, so to say, punch above their weight on account
of friendship. In the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War (171-168 BCE), agents of the Roman
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Republic rewarded their friends, in this case the people of Athens, with the sovereign control of the
significant trading center on Delos.109 The Athenians had, over the years preceding this grant, provided
the Roman Republic with a range of services including the repeated use of their harbor at the Piraeus, the
intervention of Athenian legations on behalf of Rome, and military aid.110 Following this, an IR Realist
account would find some difficulty in addressing the necessity of rewarding tiny Athens within an
inherently self-interested anarchic disorder. Such a description would be incomprehensible. The basis for
the Roman Republic’s reward of Delos to Athens had little structure other than the good faith of
friendship which, as Cicero comments, “…should correspond equally to their benevolence toward us.”111
The existence of friendship between two parties could, in a similar strain, sometimes justify the
provision of favorable treatment to states that maintained good faith. In the aftermath of the Aetolian
conflict, which I discussed above, a commission of Roman senators orchestrated a settlement of Asian
cities formerly belonging to the domain of Antiochus III, as Polybius reports:
However many of the autonomous cities originally paid tribute to Antiochus, but thereafter
maintained good faith (“πίστιν”) toward the Romans, these [the Romans] exempted from
tribute… and if some, absent from the friendship of the Romans, were fighting alongside
Antiochus, these [the Romans] commanded to hand over to Eumenes the tribute previously
given to Antiochus.112
The dynamic at work in the passage above is remarkable in both its simplicity and adherence to the norms
of friendship as an institution of international relations in the ancient world. We know nothing about the
identity of the cities under discussion, aside from their location to the west of the Taurus Mountains, but it
is fair to presume that whatever relationship they possessed with Rome was extra-legal.113 Taking this
into account, the only foundation of these friendships was the good faith of each party, which obliged the
Anatolian city-states to turn their backs on Antiochus in favor of their Roman friends. The realization of
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this discourse, that is to say actions undertaken in fulfillment of the normative expectations of friendship,
had a genuine impact on the fate of these cities and the systems they comprised. The Anatolian cities
acted in good faith, and the Republic reciprocated with exemption from direct rule and from taxation.
In some cases, the remembrance of an old friendship could protect a state from retribution despite
the choice of its leading citizens to align themselves against Roman arms. Massalia, a Greek colony
founded on the site of modern Marseille in the seventh century BCE, is one such example. According to
the traditions of the Romans, their relationship with Massalia began in the fourth century, when the
Greeks are said to have provided Rome with relief in the aftermath of the Gallic sack of 393 BCE.114 Over
the course of the next centuries, the Massalians entrenched themselves further as a friend of the Roman
Republic through their guardianship over the alpine passes into Cisalpine Gaul, as Strabo reports: “… [the
Massalians] held out against the barbarians and acquired the Roman friendship: themselves being useful
they enacted many things [for the Romans] and [the Romans] took upon themselves the enrichment [of
the Massalians].”115 According to Strabo, therefore, the basis of the Massalian-Roman friendship in the
Republican period was an informal exchange of services.
The Massalians, so far as we can say from our sources, were not bound to a formal relationship of
reciprocating obligation with the Romans, such as the foedus; however, they did possess the Roman
friendship, and this language did concretely affect the state of the city. Thus in the year 218 BCE,
according to Livy, it was the Massalians who first warned the Romans that Hannibal had crossed the
Alps, and in return received affirmation of their sovereign jurisdiction at the conflict’s end.116 A potential
break in this friendship occurred when, in 49 BCE, the Massalians sided with the faction of Pompeius
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Magnus against Julius Caesar, but the victorious Caesar chose to spare the Massalians the loss of their
ancient sovereignty on account of old friendship, as Strabo reports:
…Caesar and those ruling after him acted with moderation towards the mistakes that occurred
in the city, being mindful of its friendship (“φιλίας”), and preserve the self-governance which
the city held from its origin. The result of this was that [the Massalians] did not answer to the
officials sent into the province.117
There is a complete absence in this passage of any mention of the infringement of treaties on the part of
the Massalians or other legalistic statements that we might expect. It is true, on the other hand, that Strabo
is a geographer, not a seasoned politician; however, there is little reason to suspect that he would have
missed the rhetoric of broken treaties, had it existed. Instead, Strabo tells his audience only of “mistakes”
and “old friendship,” which is perfectly fitting, for it was merely the responsibilities of a friend that led
Massalia to this debacle and its consequences.
The use of such moralizing language in diplomatic texts significantly precedes the arrival of
Romans in the Greek East, and in those texts is closely linked with the issue of sovereignty. This surfaces
in the Athenian epigraphic record in the period before the Macedonian domination with simple phrases
like “…let the friendship and alliance be defended,”118 and often accompanies statements of oath or ritual,
as in “…the Athenians have enacted the friendship and oaths, which the King [of Persia] and the
Athenians swore.”119 This pattern of expression comes to a halt after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE,
from which point the Athenians exchanged their sovereignty for a series of Macedonian garrisons.
Typical of this period, instead of the language of friendship and oaths, is an emphasis on a relationship of
benefaction between the city and Macedonian rule. For instance, an inscription from after 276 BCE
describes Antigonus II Gonatas as “savior of the Hellenes,” and, in the same document, announces the
reward of a gold crown to the local Macedonian commander on account of his “benefaction” and “honor-
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loving.”120 When, in 266/5 BCE, the Athenians revolted against Antigonid rule, we see a return to the
standard template:
After the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and the allies of each established a friendship and
common alliance, together they conducted many glorious feats against those enslaving the
cities… and they furnished liberty for the other Greeks…121
Following the defeat of this insurrection, which followed in short order, the epigraphic record reveals the
return of the Macedonian garrison, the commander of which duly “…took from the King the commission
for the election of magistrates…” without any mention of oath or friendship.122
It is appropriate at this juncture to make a distinction between equality and sovereignty. In the
previous body of epigraphic evidence, the Athenian state ceases to publish inscriptions featuring a
particular set of terms after its loss of sovereignty. As is evident from the Macedonian’s interference with
the election, the Athenians lacked the absolute authority to enforce policy within Athens during this
period. Consider, in turn, the value that one of these terms, friendship, held for the Massalians in a
scenario of very clear asymmetry. It seems clear, therefore, that the Athenians broke from the traditional
diplomatic language of friendship in the third century BCE on account of a loss of sovereign jurisdiction,
and not merely because the Macedonians were the greater power. Indeed, the power of friendship as a
mode of rhetoric seems often to have been a buttress for the weaker friend, so Dio Cassius tells us that
Ptolemy of Egypt sought the friendship of Rome to reinforce his deteriorating control over the internal
politics of his own land.123
In the process of this, Roman friends were able to maintain the dignity of a sovereign state
because of the reciprocal nature of friendship norms, which could, in the language of Burton, place the de
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facto weaker party in a position of moral superiority over the Romans.124 This dynamic provided overbenefitting states with the leeway to undertake considerable independent action and even, in some cases,
contradict Roman policy decisions without incurring damage to the friendship. So, for instance, Attalus of
Pergamum, a friend of Rome since 209/8 BCE, could the next year undermine Roman efforts to prosecute
the first Macedonian War through the withdraw of his own forces, as Livy reports, “…thereafter, when
the news had arrived that Prusias, King of Bithynia, had crossed over the borders of his kingdom,
[Attalus] returned to Asia.”125 In a moment of editorial bitterness, Livy follows this narrative segment
with the report that Attalus had departed “…with Roman efforts and the Aetolian war neglected.”126 This
irritation owes its source, in all probability, to the reliance that the Romans had on local allies to conduct
their eastern wars while their own resources remained in the western Mediterranean to face Carthage.127
Livy’s view is one of retrospect; however, there is little reason to think that the inconvenience posed by
the Pergamene withdraw would have failed to arouse similar annoyance from contemporary Romans.
What is striking, therefore, is how little Attalus’ decision affected his subsequent relations with the
Roman Republic. At the Treaty of Phoenice (205 BCE), Roman envoys confirmed Attalus’ possession of
the island of Aegina and his status as a friend of Rome.128 Within the year, a Roman legation travelled to
Pergamum to retrieve a cult object, the Magna Mater, which Livy claims they had high hopes to obtain on
account of the friendship pact undertaken in the preceding war.129 This friendship grew further under
Attalus’ successor, Eumenes II, who receive suzerainty over substantial portions of Antiochus III’s
former realm in 188 BCE in the Treaty of Apamea.130 As this summary of the Roman-Pergamene
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friendship illustrates, Roman friends were able to maintain considerable independence of action and
internal sovereignty if they sustained norms of friendship.
In contrast, Greco-Roman sources often portray the breakdown or dissolution of interstate contact
as a failure of friendship. Later in the second century BCE, in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War
(171-168 BCE), a Rhodian embassy arrived in Rome to propose mediation. Unfortunately for the
Rhodians, the Romans had just learned of their victory over Macedon at the Battle of Pydna, and
therefore understood the Rhodians arrival as a gesture in favor of Macedon. Public favor shifted against
the Rhodians in due course, and though they avoided war, which the Romans contemplated, the situation
did result in their loss of substantial territories in Asia Minor, as Polybius reports: “…it was necessary
that Caria and Lycia and all those be at liberty which [the Senate] allotted to the Rhodians after the
Antiochean War.”131 The condemnation that precedes this in Polybius is overwhelmingly moral, with the
historian claiming that “…the sense [of the Senate’s] answer was that, if not for a few of their own
friends, and especially through their own action, [the Rhodians] would have known well and correctly
that which was fitting for them to incur.”132 The distinction between this and the previous example when,
true enough, Attalus abandoned a Roman war, is that the Rhodians violated the normative requirements of
friendship and Attalus did not. Where in Attalus’ case he was able to present his withdraw as necessary to
defend Pergamum, the Rhodians’ own contradiction of Roman aims appeared self-serving, as Livy writes:
“…if there had been a concern, of the sort which was feigned, then envoys ought to have been sent when
Perseus [of Macedon]… was besieging the other cities.”133 The disruption of the Roman-Rhodian
relationship appears, therefore, in both the Roman and Greek traditions as a failure of friendship norms,
and correspondingly leads to a tangible decrease in the territorial space of Rhodes.
The expectation on the part of our sources, so evident in Livy, that Roman friends should justify
their status as friends through the exchange of services is especially clear in the text of Sallust’s The
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Jugurthine War. Indeed, it becomes clear that the provision of services to Rome is, in the eyes of Sallust,
both a condition for the commencement of friendship and the principle source of its perpetuity. When
Bocchus I, the King of Mauretania and confederate of Rome’s enemy, Jugurtha, seeks to switch sides and
acquire the Roman friendship, Sallust places the following words in the mouth of the Roman official L.
Cornelius Sulla:
… [Sulla] disclosed to [Bocchus]… that the Roman Senate and people… are not soon to
consider [him] in their grace… that something should be done for [Rome] which would seem to
have benefitted them more than his own interests… that it would be easy, because he was in
possession of the plans of Jugurtha, [and] that he would be owed much for this, namely their
friendship…134
The friendship of the Roman State, therefore, is closely connected to the utility of its friends, who
themselves participate in the friendship because they receive concrete rewards for their service. Sulla
promises Bocchus, for instance, “that part of Numidia, which he was seeking.”135 Elsewhere in Sallust’s
account, he describes the military assistance of Masinissa, a King of the Numidians “accepted into
friendship by P. Scipio,” as earning him numerous territorial acquisitions after the conflicts’ end.136 This
reward served the dual purpose, according to Sallust, of rewarding Masinissa and also ensuring that
“…the friendship of Masinissa remained good and honorable for us.”137 Such a friendship is clearly at the
discretion of Roman actors at this rather late stage in Rome’s advance to hegemony, but remains notable
for the value it retains in the hands of lesser actors.
This trend toward the assertion, on the part of Rome, of its status as the senior partner within
international friendships corresponds with an increasing tendency, in Latin sources, to describe these
relationships as an act of compulsion toward the lesser party. In the Res Gestae Divi Augusti, an account
of Augustus’ accomplishments as the leading man in Rome, the author mentions that “…I compelled the
Parthians to return the equipment and banners of three Roman armies to me and, as supplicants, to seek
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the friendship of the Roman people.”138 The corresponding passage of Eutropius adds that the Parthians
handed over hostages to Augustus at this time, although this may just as well have been a desire to
remove those individuals from the internecine feuding of the Parthian court.139 In either case, it is clear
from the language of the passage that friendship, in the view of imperial policy, was something that could
be impressed upon a lesser party. It is, perhaps, further evidence for a shift toward “harsher” friendship
language that the Greek text of the Res Gestae reads in this place “…I compelled the Parthians to return
the equipment and banners of three Roman armies to me and, as supplicants, to consider worthy the
friendship of the Roman people.”140 It is fairly typical in the Res Gestae for the Greek version to tone
down the more aggressive language of its Latin counterpart.141 That this occurs in this place, with regard
to friendship, could reflect a sensitivity on the part of the Romans that their relationships with Greek citystates within the empire were still often expressed as friendships. This connection, as I hope we have seen
by now, was tied to patterns of moralizing discourse and modes of reciprocation intrinsically linked to the
good faith and intent of either party. Compulsion simply does not match this.
Over the course of this chapter, we have considered the facility of international friendship, and
particularly its discursive norms, to affect the behavior of classical actors per the view of our sources.
These connections existed in a state system that grew increasingly asymmetrical as the Roman Republic
displaced all other major actors during the long second century BCE. For the most part, the importance of
extra-legal connections for lesser states relates directly to their increasing dependence on the good faith of
the hegemon, the Roman Republic. This friendship allowed the Anatolian statelets to preserve their
autonomy in the aftermath of the Treaty of Apamea (188 BCE), and the Massalians briefly averted their
annexation to the province of Transalpine Gaul on account of old friendship. Furthermore, Roman friends
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obtained tangible benefits when they matched the expectations of friendship, such as Massinisa’s
territorial gains after the Jugurthine War, and could even, at least in an early period, follow an
independent policy so long as it adhered to the normative expectations of friendship, as with Attalus. In
these ways, therefore, lesser states in the Mediterranean World were able to assert their agency and, in
doing so, preserve some measure of internal control and independent policy. Let us now turn to Athens.

Chapter 5: Friendship, Alliance, and Atheno-Roman Diplomacy
The emergence of the Roman Republic as the undisputed master of the Mediterranean state
system affected a gradual transformation in its representation in Athenian inscriptions. From the middle
of the second century BCE, inscriptions erected in Athens describe the conduct of sacrifices “…for the
Roman allies.”142 This first mention arrives at the conclusion of a sixty-year period of cooperation that
equipped the Athenian state with a level of influence and wealth unknown to it since the fourth century
BCE.143 Behind this revival was the Athenian state’s cultivation of its own image as a faithful Roman
friend and, as such, its deployment of a range of moral language that reinforced this portrayal. Over time,
the Athenians benefitted from their construction of this identity because the normative patterns of their
friendship with Rome led to rewards that vastly outstripped the Athenians’ geopolitical importance.
Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapters, the primary terms operative in Athenian diplomacy,
alliance and friendship (“συμμαχία καὶ φιλία”), are only appropriate for actors that possess at least a
limited sovereignty. The language of Athenian inscriptions which prompted this study, therefore, reflects
one aspect of a wider discourse that empowered the Athenians to claim an independent identity while at
the same time benefitting substantially from the realization of the diplomatic relationship that this
language asserts. Even so, the position of Athens underwent substantial change as Roman dominance
developed towards the city’s effective incorporation into the province of Achaea in 27 BCE, a
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transformation which the historiographic and epigraphic records record through an increasing emphasis
on the cultural prestige of Athens rather than its status as a political actor.
The objective of the current chapter will be to demonstrate the utility of rhetoric as a strategic tool
for the Athenian state, and in particular to highlight the substantial influence of the terms developed in the
previous chapters. This discussion will unfold, in broad outline, over a period stretching from the
inception of Atheno-Roman contact in 228 BCE to the effect termination of Athens’ status as a sovereign
state in around 27 BCE.144 The principal evidence employed in this argument will rest on a combination
of passages from the ancient historians and inscriptions published and displayed in Attica within the time
frame of this study. While the bulk of the narrative evidence will derive from the historians, the
epigraphic evidence nevertheless plays a crucial role as it is the existence of these sources that allows us
to ascertain the extent to which the language prescribed to Athenians in the historians reflects the actual
diplomacy of the Athenian state. Taken together, the historiographic and epigraphic evidence will allow
us to delineate developments in the relationship between the Athenian and Roman states, which will
correspond in this study to two periods detailing the height and decline of this association.
It is possible to make a connection between the rhetoric of Athenian diplomats as they appear in
the ancient historians and the discursive behavior of actual Athenians because of the appearance of the
same language of friendship and alliance in both historical and epigraphic sources. Of particular use in
establishing this fact with regards to Athens is a particular tradition of inscriptions relating to the
Ephebes, a corps of young Athenians enrolled in the service of the state. One common feature of these
inscriptions is the appearance of phrases including the words alliance (“συμμαχία”), friendship (“φιλία”),
and the adjectival variations of each. In total, this body of evidence comprises eight substantial
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inscriptions spanning an eighty year period beginning in the mid-second century BCE.145 While this data
is, on its own, too small a sample to substantiate claims about change over time in Athenian rhetoric, the
production of such inscriptions throughout the period under consideration does instill confidence in the
language of the historians and therefore improves our ability to study the Athenians as an actor through
that medium.
Before proceeding into the first section of the analysis, it is appropriate to first review the
definitions of the primary terms discussed in chapters three and four. The word alliance (“συμμαχία”)
corresponds to a relationship of reciprocal obligation between two actors and is expressly restricted to
sovereign actors. This condition permits a high degree of asymmetry between the contracting parties, as
we saw with its application to Alexander the Great’s lieutenants, but requires that the lesser party retain
an independent decision-making capacity.146 So, for instance, the Lycian-Greeks of Strabo’s account felt
that they lacked the authority to enact alliance (“συμμαχία”) because they lacked even the appearance of
judgment in their affairs – the Romans possessed that. The corresponding Roman concept of societas
lacked both the formal quality of συμμαχία as a technical descriptor for alliance and the latter’s
inapplicability to actors without de facto sovereignty. The second principle term of this analysis,
friendship (“φιλία”), relates to a wider system of heavily moralizing discursive norms that played a
significant constitutive role in the ancient Mediterranean world. International friendship carried with it the
expectation of the fidelity and utility of each friend, and when this relationship was healthy it followed
that friends would benefit one another. In line with this, the passages to follow will reflect the attempts on
the part of the Athenian state to construct itself in the profitable guise of friend to Rome.

The Inception of Atheno-Roman Friendship
The earliest known interactions between Athenian and Roman magistrates occurred through a
series of diplomatic exchanges at the conclusion of the third century BCE which, though complicated by
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textual interpolations in the historiographic tradition, nevertheless speak to the normativity of AthenoRoman friendship. Roman officials passed through Athens on at least one occasion in the 220s BCE, but
the purpose of this visit was only to convey news of Rome’s victory in the Illyrian War (229 BCE).147 For
the first true diplomatic exchange between Athenians and Romans, we must turn instead to the events
leading up to the Second Macedonian War (200 – 197 BCE), but the evidence of our sources complicates
this claim. As we saw in the first chapter, the historical tradition of Polybius and Livy reveals the
presence of Athens as a party on the Roman side in the Treaty of Phoenice (205 CE).148 Scholars now
agree for the most part that a historian of the first century BCE, Valerius Antias, inserted the names of
Athens and Ilium.149 The reason for this was to provide a moral justification for Roman intervention
across the Adriatic five years later, as Balsdon remarks, “… [the] purpose can only have been to lend
substance to the claim that Rome was bound by solemn obligations contracted in 205 to come to the aid
of her Greek allies in 200.”150 If we take this to be correct, as I do, and accept that an ahistorical account
of the events of 205 BCE has marred our evidence for the first true interaction between Athenian and
Roman in 200 BCE, then we should also treat that evidence as historically suspect. For this reason the
evidence lacks explanatory power for the events of 200 BCE; however, the implications are useful: it is
clear that later Roman historians considered the informal and moral association of Rome and Athens to be
a strong justification for intervention.
The supposed relationship between Athens and Rome in 200 BCE has precisely these
characteristics in the Livian narrative, but first some background is in order. According to Livy, the
Athenians planted the first seeds of the Second Macedonian War (200 – 197 BCE) when they executed a
number of aristocratic youths from Acarnania.151 The charge was participation in the Eleusinian Mysteries
without undergoing the solemn rites, and the consequence was the embitterment of the Acarnanians’ ally,
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Philip of Macedon. Within a short time, Philip dispatched a military force to ravage the fields of Attica.152
It was, as Livy remarks, “a hardly worthy cause.”153 The Athenians stood little chance in a contest with
Antigonid Macedon, and in the Livian account they appeal to Egypt and Rome for assistance.154 In the
case of Rome, the Athenians seem to have made their appeal without any claim to a formal treaty. In fact,
Livy presents the Roman Senate as making its decision to help only in response to the “prayers of the
Athenians.”155 This claim corresponds with and is dependent upon the historical interpolations that we
discussed above, and the reason for this is that the ahistorical interpolation of 205 BCE enshrined Athens
in an informal compact, not a formal treaty.156 As we observed in the previous chapter, informal
relationships of friendship were extremely normative in the Greco-Roman world, and could at times
substantially influence the behavior of actors. If it is correct that later historians altered portions of the
Polybo-Livian tradition concerning Atheno-Roman contact, the point to take away from this is more so
the particular way that the interlopers construed this lie than the fact of the lie itself. When considering
the theory that an interpolation did occur, it is worth noting that there are a variety of ways that Roman
editors could have presented the supposed relationship between Rome and Athens, and that of these they
selected moral obligation to Athens to justify their state’s intervention in 200 BCE. In this sense,
therefore, the Livian account at least provides us with some idea of contemporary norms through its
emphasis on the rhetorical power of moral obligation.
In considering the antiquity of the Romans’ friendship with the Athenians it is important to
emphasize that the diplomatic existence of the Athenians preceded the arrival of Romans, and as such
their state possessed and maintained significant relationships with other actors. At the beginning of the
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third century BCE the Athenians had only just begun to show a serious interest in developing a
relationship with the Roman Republic. Over the preceding century, the Athenians had looked instead to
Ptolemaic Egypt as their guardian and benefactor.157 The death of Ptolemy IV in 204 BCE and the weak
regency of Ptolemy V undermined the capacity of the Egyptian kingdom to help even itself, prompting
what Arthur Eckstein has called a “power transition crisis” in the Mediterranean state system.158 The
immediate implication of this was to propel the other major Hellenistic monarchies onto a collision course
with Rome.159 On the local level, the decline of Ptolemaic Egypt represented the gradual loss of the
Athenians’ primary security partner.160 The Romans would eventually assume this role, but did so only
gradually over the decades leading up to the Third Macedonian War (171 – 168 BCE). Significantly, it
would do so without displacing the Athenians’ other patrons and security partners in the process.
With the exception of the faltering Egyptian monarchy, the most important of these contacts was
the Kingdom of Pergamum in Asia Minor. The reigning Attalid house was a frequent financier of public
works projects such as the stoas of Attalus and Eumenes at the base of the Acropolis, and was a reliable
source of aid to the Athenians in the same conflict that first brought them before the Roman Senate.161
The importance of this connection to the Athenian eye is evident in one of the first Athenian inscriptions
to reference the Romans, which reads as follows:162
Σάτυρος Σατύρου ἐκ Κολ[ων]οῦ εἶπεν· ἐπει-

Saturos son of Saturos from Kolon spoke:

δὴ Καλλιφάνης Φυλάσιος στρατευόμε-

Since Kalliphanes of Phyle fought as an auxiliary

νος μετὰ Ῥ̣ωμ
̣ αί[ων] καὶ τῶν [τ]οῦ βασιλέ-

alongside the Romans and the brothers

ως Ε[ὐ]μένους ἀδελφῶν Ἀττάλου καὶ

of King Eumenes, Attalus and Athenaius,
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Ἀθηναίου καὶ χρήσιμον ἑαυτὸν παρα-

and desired to make himself of service

σκευάζειν βουλόμενος τῆι πατρίδι

to the fatherland, //

συμπ[αρ]ῆν τ[ῆ]ι γενομέ[νη]ι [ν]ίκηι Ῥωμαίοις

he was present at the victory for the Romans

ἐμ Μα[κ]εδ[ο]νίαι…

in Macedonia…

The purpose of this inscription prima facie is to announce the award of various honors to Kalliphanes, an
Athenian present at the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE, but it also preserves a space for the recognition of
the Athenians’ co-belligerents.163 The victory at Pydna was, ultimately, a Roman achievement, so it is
unsurprising that the inscription mentions the Romans and emphasizes their status as victors. More
interesting is the inclusion of Attalus and Athenaius, brothers to the king of Pergamum. Because the
Pergamene contribution to the battle was likely marginal it makes more sense to consider the diplomatic
value of their inclusion than the necessity of doing so.164 Through the inclusion of the Attalid brothers in
the above decree, the Athenians could emphasize their connection with Pergamum even as they honor the
Roman Republic.
The contribution of the Athenians themselves to Pydna was just as marginal as that of the
Attalids, but this fact reflects the dynamics of the incipient Atheno-Roman friendship more than any
distance in their relationship. At the start of the conflict, the Athenians offered a substantial contingent of
men and vessels to the Roman Senate, as Livy reports: “…the Athenians were introduced first; they
explained that they had dispatched what they possessed of ships and men.” The Roman magistrate in
Greece at the start of the war (171 BCE), P. Licinius Crassus, had rejected the Athenian offer and instead
commanded (“imperasse”) them to provide a substantial quantity of grain.165 It is certain that the Romans
permitted other Greek states to send them contingents of men and ships, so the reason for this rejection
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must fall to some other feature of the Athenian state.166 Equally certain is our ability to exclude the vigor
of Athenian agriculture from a list of possible factors, as they had relied upon cereal imports from the
Black Sea region since the fifth century BCE.167 Instead, the reason seems to fall to either the Athenians’
feeble military strength or to a terse moment on the part of Crassus. The Athenians responded to the
Roman command in a manner more befitting the dynamics we considered in chapter four, informing the
Senate that they had fulfilled the command and “…although they were farming barren land… so they
might not seem wanting in their duty (“officio”)… are prepared to provide more.”168 Of course, we can
imagine that the Athenians were only able to fulfill the first demand with great difficulty; the point here is
a moral one. It is a mark of international friendship that each partner maintains the appearance of utility,
this is the duty (“officio”) that Livy mentions. The Athenians were unable to participate in the Battle of
Pydna for reasons that are lost to us, but their reaction to this rejection approximates the cycles of
international friendship and, it turns out, so does the next Roman response to this chain of interactions.
In the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War, many established friends of the Roman Republic
faced a substantial backlash owing to their failure to meet the expectations of friendship. The Rhodians
lost their sovereignty over parts of Asia Minor because of duplicitous exchanges with Macedon, and
Eumenes II of Pergamum most likely lost his claim to several territories in Asia Minor on a similar
charge.169 Athenians, on the other hand, benefitted substantially from the careful attentions that they paid
to their Roman alliance during the Third Macedonian War. Most important of these benefits was
sovereignty over the significant trading center on Delos, which Strabo later claimed could process ten-
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thousand slaves each day.170 There has been some amount of dispute in the scholarship over the
significance of this award. This is in large part because the Romans, in bequeathing Delos to Athens,
stipulated that the island remain tariff free.171 The immediate purpose for this was likely to punish the
Rhodians, who experienced an eighty-five percent loss in revenue as a result, but Delos’ tariff free status
may also have affected Athens.172 The argument for this charge is that the Athenian economy was heavily
reliant upon the tariffs imposed upon commercial vessels at its own port facilities, and that the Roman
ruling would force the Athenians to drop their tariffs to remain competitive.173 We have insufficient
evidence to rule on whether or not this occurred, but it is possible to reject the thesis that the acquisition
of Delos negatively impacted Athenian finances. Since the fifth century BCE, the silver mines of
Laureium had been a major bulwark for Athens’ treasury; however, those mines were starting to dry
up.174 With the acquisition of Delos, the Athenians acquired substantial silver reserves and began to mint
a new series of tetradrachm currency, which became the dominant currency in circulation until the
denarius overtook it in the first century BCE.175 The Athenians, despite the initially harsh reaction of
Licinius Crassus in 171 BCE, stuck to patterns of friendship exchange and ultimately came out ahead in a
period when less careful Roman friends experienced serious reversals.
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The claim in Livy’s account that Crassus “commanded” the Athenians to furnish the Roman
legions with grain brings us to the further question of whether, in this early stage, we should regard
Athens as a client state with implicit obligations to meet Roman demands. Badian argued in Foreign
Clientelae that it is characteristic of the Roman client to follow the judgment of his patron.176 Cicero
likewise describes Roman aristocrats’ fear of falling under the obligation of a benefactor as his client.177 It
is significant, therefore, that the Athenian state pursued a foreign policy that sometimes stands in contrast
to the trends of the Roman Senate’s policies. So, for instance, the Athenians choose to emphasize their
relationship with the Attalid dynasty in 168 BCE while at the same time the Senate displayed its disfavor
toward the Attalids with their denial of territorial grants. Earlier, in 191 BCE, the Roman Senate was
intent on inflicting an especially severe punishment upon the Aetolian League, but Polybius tells us that
the senators changed their minds “…because the Rhodians and Athenians thought it correct.”178 Livy,
who is closely following Polybius in this episode, further reinforces the importance of Athens’ and
Rhodes’ moral authority with his claim that the Aetolians had solicited their help because “…their
pleadings (“preces”) might gain an easier entrance because of the stature (“auctoritatem”) of those
states.”179 This moral authority stands in contrast to the position of the Aetolians, whose situation Livy
characterizes as a breach in the good faith (“fide”) of their partnership (“societatis”) with Rome.180 The
solution for the plight of one state, the Aetolian League, which has violated friendship norms, is to appeal
to the moral authority of two states that had to this time excelled in that relationship. Significantly, the
event indicates the capacity of Roman friends to take a stand on issues contra senatorial opinion and
succeed.
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The Athenian acquisition of Delos and a number of other Mediterranean islands was a benefit of
their friendship with the Roman Republic, but the future of Delos as an Athenian subject was intertwined
with the interests of the island’s substantial Italian mercantile community.181 Because of this, Roman
magistrates frequently interfered to pass judgment on the island’s affairs; however, the diplomatic
procedures that mediated this interference allowed the Athenians to preserve the appearance of
sovereignty. This exchange began, as the Polybian account proceeds, when an Athenian embassy to the
Roman Senate made a case for Delos and other Macedonian possessions as their share of the spoils in 168
BCE.182 The basis of the Athenian argument was the antiquity of their claim, as is evident from an
inscription of the first century BCE purporting to list the island’s gymnasiarchs “…from the time when
the people recovered the island through the Romans.”183 Despite this “recovery,” the Romans seem to
have been aware that the island had been theirs to give, as in an inscription of the mid-second century
BCE, which preserves the Athenian response to a judgment that the Roman Senate made concerning
Delos:184
The General to Charmides, [Governor] of Delos, Greetings: After the exchange of rather a few
words in the council concerning the decree which Demetrius bore from Rome concerning the
Sarapeion affair, it was judged best to not prevent that man from opening and servicing the
shrine as before.
The point of contention in this episode is the status of the shrine of Sarapis on Delos, which the Athenians
had attempted to close.185 Representatives of the cult appealed this decision to the Roman Senate, which
decided in their favor and forwarded its position to the Athenians. We possess the first half of this text,
which simply states “…concerning the matters that Demetrius spoke of… it is permitted for that man to
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service the shrine of Sarapis on Delos.”186 Diplomatically, this message falls short of using any language
to the effect that the Senate was ordering the Athenians to rescind the closure, but it is nevertheless clear
that this is the intent of the exchange. In their message to Charmides, inscribed above a copy of the
senatorial decree, the Athenians are careful to stress the view that they debate the issue with “…the
exchange of rather a few words…” and decided to heed Rome’s advice of their own volition.
Representatives of the Roman Republic were, in this period, mostly consistent in their efforts to
extend such courtesies to Greek States, and, again, this discourse could hold a greater significance than
mere euphemism for those who maintained a balanced relationship with the Romans. At roughly the same
time as the Sarapis affair, in the 150s BCE, Athenians participated on the side of Ptolemy VI in one of the
Egyptian Kingdom’s endless civil wars.187 Significantly, the Roman Senate had given its support to
another contender for the throne, Ptolemy VIII Physcon.188 As we have seen, the conclusion of the Third
Macedonian War and the acquisition of Delos represented a high point in the Atheno-Roman relationship.
According to the trends of international friendship discussed in chapter four, the Athenians were at some
liberty to undertake independent action as a beneficial friend to Rome; however, the preservation of this
balance called for a compensating act to favor Roman interests.189 That this was the case is evident from
the latent concerns in an inscription that Ptolemy VI Philometor had erected on Delos after his Athenianbacked victory, which reads “…King Ptolemy… pious and the most cultured of men… established a
friendship (“φιλίαν”) and peace, in doing so consulting the oracles… and… especially desiring to please
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the Romans.”190 Taken from the Ptolemaic perspective, therefore, it is clear that success contrary to the
wishes of the Roman Senate prompted some nervous tension and, in this instance, Ptolemy VI began to
move toward healing the breach by emphasizing the authority of the Romans. As per usual, this tendency
expresses itself in the moral language of pleasure and fulfillment rather than a more legal register. For the
Athenians, a similar compensation for subversive behavior occurred through their subsequent
participation in the Achaean War (146 BCE) and, as Habicht notes, the contribution of five triremes for
the campaign against Carthage.191
While the Ptolemaic connection of the previous example lays a clear emphasis on the position of
the Roman Republic as the chief power in the Mediterranean system, it also illustrates the vibrancy of the
connections between lesser actors and their capacity to pursue independent policies. It is important to
keep in mind that the Romans only established themselves permanently in the Greek East in 146 BCE,
with the creation of the province of Macedonia.192 Greek states, including Athens, were prolific in the
dispatch of embassies to Rome; however, these met with varied success, and, as Erskine reflects
“…initially different images of Rome would have been generated highlighting different aspects of this
new power.”193 The Athenians in particular understood the importance of the Roman Republic from an
early stage and began to cultivate the Romans in the language of international friendship, but at the same
time they maintained a diversity of foreign relations and fell short of emphasizing Rome as what we
might call a “best friend.”

Atheno-Roman Friendship and the Decline of the Athenian State
The system of foreign contacts that the Athenian state maintained fell into a steady decline in the
latter half of the second century BCE alongside the collapse of most of its non-Roman partners. From the
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beginning of the third century BCE, the most significant actors surrounding Athens were the Achaean
League and a number of Macedonian garrisons.194 The latter ceased to be a factor in 197 BCE, when T.
Quinctius Flamininus compelled Philip V of Macedon to surrender his remaining possessions in Greece
proper.195 This settlement precipitated a series of events that led to the destruction of the Macedonian
Kingdom (168 BCE), the division of its former holdings into four republics under Roman supervision,
and, following the revolt of Andriscos, the designation of Macedonia as a Roman province (146 BCE).196
The final conflict with an independent Macedon coincided with the Achaean War and, tangentially, the
Roman destruction of Carthage in North Africa.197 Substantial portions of the former Achaean League
then fell under the administrative jurisdiction of the Roman provincial government, bringing the physical
influence of Roman power within a day’s ride of Athens.198 To add to this sharp decline in significant
actors, the final Attalid King of Pergamum, Attalus III, bequeathed his lands to the Romans upon his
death in 133 BCE.199 The result of all this is that in the space of twenty years the regional dominance of
the area around Athens transitioned from the hands of several medium-sized powers to the direct rule of
Roman governors. Even so, the Athenians were cautious political operators, and changes to reflect the
new status quo were slow.
This period is also notable for the first stirrings of a cultural rather than strictly political exchange
between Athens and the Roman Republic. Connections between the senatorial elite and the Athenian
community were to become a substantial influence in the next century, and the seeds for this had already
sprung.200 An ephebic inscription of 116/115 BCE displays the name Gnaeus the Roman (“Γναῖος...
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Ῥωμαίος”) within a roster also featuring cadets from Laodicea, Antiochia, and Attica.201 Athens had
become a popular center of education for the aristocracies of the Greek world in the previous century, and
here, at the conclusion of the second, we begin to observe Romans drawn to the same appeal.202
Underlying this change is the increasing necessity for the Athenians to utilize their cultural prestige as a
political tool, for as Rosillo-Lopez remarks, “The past… offered the aristocracy social worth and political
legitimacy in the present; it also helped them to preserve its status and functional role.”203 The governing
class of the Athenian state found itself increasingly unable to participate in a relationship of power-utility
with the Roman Republic as the locus of Roman power shifted east. In the past, the Athenians had
developed an effective and reciprocating international friendship with the Romans under circumstances
when they could provide them with significant services. Until 146 BCE, Roman fleets relied on Athenian
harbor facilities in each successive conflict, and Athenian diplomats often stood for Roman interests in
Hellenic assemblies.204 After this date, however, the Romans possessed their own facilities, and had
established bi-lateral relationships with all significant actors, precluding Athenian assistance.205 RosilloLopez is correct, therefore, in the assessment that increasing Roman hegemony called for changes in the
diplomatic modus of a Greek state such as Athens.
The Athenians increasingly turned to cultural prestige as an instrument of diplomacy, but this
existed in coordination with previous modes of discourse rather than displacing them. This is in
opposition to the claim of Rosillo-Lopez, who states that the Senate of the third century BCE “…would
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concede… to the Greeks because Rome needed their support… The [later] loss of Greek political
power… allowed Greeks to be associated more with the past than the present.”206 This argument conflates
the related dichotomies of cultural and political transitions. It assumes that because the Greeks’ lacked de
facto political power in the later second century BCE they also lacked the capacity to engage in a
discourse structured around the political. On a deeper level, it assumes that political rhetoric will match
abstract political realities. Instead, as we saw in the previous chapters, Greek political rhetoric could
accommodate itself to stark asymmetries. Rosillo-Lopez is correct that Greek states found themselves in
the position of seeking and defining new strategies, but these supplemented the still potent language of
tradition. So, for example, the Athenians continued to publish decrees discussing their states friendships
and alliances until the end of its tenure as a sovereign state.207 In some cases, the emergence of cultural
rhetoric appears alongside more traditional ideas of political friendship. For instance, an inscription on
Delos dating to the period around 116/115 BCE – precisely the year that Gnaeus joined the ephebes in
Athens – refers to the author’s kinship (“συγγενὴς”) and dear friendship (“προσφιλὲς”) with Ptolemy of
Egypt.208 This immediately follows a line that describes the Egyptian kingdom as a bulwark or defense
(“ἔρυμα”), and precedes a dedication to the Roman consuls. The succeeding lines suffer from a high
degree of fragmentation, but the phrase “of the Trojans and the Danaans” (“Τρώων καὶ Δαναῶν”) is
legible. The Romans maintained a popular myth that they were the descendants of Aeneas’ band of
Trojan exiles, and on this basis it is possible that the appearance of these words reflects an attempt on the
part of the inscriptions’ author to cater to cultural sentiment.
The behavior of the Athenians, and specifically their attempts to placate the Roman power,
reflects the situation of a small state operating under an increasingly central hegemonic power while at the
same time maximizing its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. The Athenians did maintain

Rosillo-Lopez, “Greek Self-Presentation to the Roman Republican Power,” 23.
IG II2 1042: “…ἐφ’ ὑ]γιείᾳ καὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆ[ς βουλῆς καὶ] // [τοῦ δήμ]ου καὶ παίδων καὶ γυ[να]ικῶν καὶ τῶν
φίλ[ων…”; IG II2 1028: “…τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίοις…”
208
ID 1533.
206
207

N o r t h | 59
such a policy, but it existed within the confines of their relationship with Rome and, as such, came over
time to comprise relationships of benefaction with Roman client states, such as Ptolemaic Egypt, and
local Greek affairs. This latter case falls well in line with the Roman habit of delegating interstate
mediation to its regional partners.209 At the same time that this compression of independent political
action occurred, the Athenians maintained the claim that they possessed a plurality of foreign “friends and
allies.” With respect to the Romans, this speaks to the fact that normative friendship remained a
worthwhile card for states that maintained the cycles of that relationship. Variations of the word for
alliance continue in spite of the probable non-existence of an Atheno-Roman alliance because of the
correspondence of the technically-obliging Greek alliance (“συμμάχια”) to the empty Roman partnership
(“societas”). It is not that the Athenians lacked the ability to understand the dissonance between these
terms, but that the misrecognition of this distinction favored their self-presentation.
The final stage of Athens’ existence as an independent state began with an assertion of that
agency, and precipitated sixty years of terminal decline culminating in its final loss of sovereignty during
the Roman civil wars of the first century BCE. Over this period, the Athenians participated in all of the
civil wars that plagued the final years of the Roman Republic, and in doing so exhibited a catastrophic
tendency to find them themselves on the losing side.210 Unlike the cities of the Achaean League in the
previous century, the Athenians maintained their nominal independence after each siege on account of
appeals to its antiquity and friendship to Rome. Because of this rhetoric, and the norms of Greco-Roman
diplomacy that stood behind it, the Athenians were able to preserve a shadow of their independence in
ready contrast to the fate of other minor actors. However, it is characteristic of this final stage that this
independence is increasingly nominal in the context of the new unipolar system, and this change reflects
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itself in a corresponding decline in the Athenians’ use of the language of a sovereign state in their
decrees.
Ironically, the beginning of the end for the Athenian state sprang from an excess of popular
authority. The city’s philosophers had begun to play a leading role in Athens’ diplomatic relations during
the second century BCE, starting with the embassy of Carneades in 155 BCE.211 It is possible that the
attachment of young Roman aristocrats to famous Athenian philosophers further increased their
importance due to the proximity this provided to informal channels. As a result, it is less surprising than it
might seem that a philosopher of the Peripatetic school led Athens into war against the Roman Republic
in 88 BCE.212 Our sources contradict themselves as to the identity of this man, but G. R. Bugh has argued
convincingly that there were in fact two philosopher-tyrants, Aristion and Athenion.213 The first took
power as a leader of the city’s anti-Roman faction after the removal of the pro-Roman oligarchy that had
controlled Athens over the previous decades. This uprising coincided with the invasion of Mithridates VI
Eupator into the Roman provinces of Asia and Achaea.214
The Athenians had begun their own stirrings against Rome in reaction to the eastern King’s
actions, and in short order came into the friendship (“φιλίαν”) of the king.215 At the same time, the
Athenians launched a naval expedition to recover their colony on Delos, which had chosen to remain
faithful to the Romans at the conflicts’ start.216 This expedition was disastrously unsuccessful, but was
followed soon after by the island’s successful capture at the hand of Mithridates’ admiral, Archelaus.217
At this point, Athenion disappears from the historical narrative, and our sources instead speak of Aristion,
whom Appian considered the most loathsome of tyrants.218 This Aristion first arrived in Athens at the
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head of a cavalry squadron escorting the treasures of Delos to Athens itself.219 It was not long thereafter
that he found himself facing a siege opposite the Roman warlord and general L. Cornelius Sulla.220 The
ensuing blockade was lengthy and ended with the breach of Athens’ north-west gate.221 After a brief
attempt to seek refuge on the Acropolis, Aristion fell at the hands of Sulla’s legionaries. The siege had
lasted for many months, entailed untold and forgotten deprivations for the city’s inhabitants, and it was
still to face Sulla’s judgment.
What happened next is the stage of considerable controversy, with some scholars opting to
believe that Sulla imposed constitutional change on the Athenians while others argue the opposite. Arthur
Keaveney, in support of the view that Sulla did enforce such a change, advances a common view with his
statement that “…Unfortunately little is known… we may safely assume… it was designed… to put an
end to that internal strife which had allowed tyrants to seize control of the city.”222 Keaveney is at the
very least correct in his assessment of the paucity of the source materials, which amount to scattered
references in Appian and Livy. The later account of Appian tells us that Sulla restored the city to its
previous laws, while the Livian account claims that “… [Sulla returned to the city its liberty and those
things which it had held.”223 According to Appian, this occurred only after Sulla pronounced that those
who fought against him and their posterity were forever banned from holding office in Athens.224
The Appian account in particular seems to suggest both infringements upon Athenian sovereignty
after the siege and the preexistence of Roman influence on the Athenian constitution. Geagan, in support
of this view, has pointed out that the Athenian state published lists of its annual magistrates with greater
regularity following the Sullan sack.225 The direction of this argument is that Sulla forced the Athenians to
keep better records to prevent the accumulation of power in the hands of tyrannical figures. This position
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seems insufficient, however, when considering that the Athenians returned to oligarchic rule in 87 BCE,
and has its detractors.226 Christian Habicht, to name one, rejects this view on the grounds that Roman
intervention in the Athenian constitution was unnecessary to achieve Sulla’s aims, as he writes:227
The Athenian constitution in force after Sulla’s defeat of the city need not necessarily have been
imposed by Sulla. More probably, he would have had no need to intervene, for his victory
returned to power the old elite who had always been loyal to Rome and who had been only
temporarily displaced by the rule of the tyrants Athenion and Aristion.
Since the conclusion of the second century BCE, pro-Roman oligarchs had exercised the ultimate
authority in Athens and, with the death of the tyrants and radical democrats in the Mithridatic War, the
natural cycle of city-state politics returned an oligarchy to the stage.
Across the period when these events occurred, the epigraphic record reveals few changes in the
Athenians’ self-representation of their state as an international actor. At the turn of the century, a decree
of the ephebic type states that the cadets conducted an escort “for the Roman allies and benefactors of the
people (“τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίοις”).”228 With minor variation, this is the
same form of address that the Athenians had begun to use for official references to Rome in 121/120
BCE. Further examples occur throughout the 90s, and, while we lack examples for the period following
the Roman siege, the type returns in the 40s.229 Alongside the escort formula, which describes the Romans
alternately as friends and allies, the record also reveals the continued existence of the formula referencing
foreign contacts collectively. An example from between 83 and 78 BCE, in typical form, describes
sacrifice on behalf of the collective friends and allies.230 The distinction between this claim and those of
the previous century is that we no longer find these same terms as descriptors for the Athenians’ bi-lateral
relationships. Instead, Athenian inscriptions of the first century that relate to specific foreign parties
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describe them in the language of benefaction. In this manner, an inscription of the mid-century praises
Antiochus I Theos of Commagene “on account of his virtue.”231 This type of honorific, which speaks of
the virtue of an individual rather than the relationship between two actors, becomes progressively more
common as, correspondingly, the traditional vocabulary of friendship and alliance begins to disappear
from Athenian inscriptions.232 However, the Athenians still retained the use of this language in some of
their domestic decrees, and in this use it was self-descriptive. This language persisted because, as an
independent state, the Athenians could employ it, and further, because there was inherent value attached
to this form of self-representation.
Over the decades leading up to the Roman civil wars of the mid-century, the Athenians struck an
uneasy posture between independence and the undeniable authority of the Roman imperial presence. This
culminated, briefly, with the actual loss of Athenian sovereignty in 58 BCE. In the background of the
event was a plebiscite of the notorious Roman tribune Clodius Pulcher, who expanded the jurisdiction of
the incoming governor of Macedonia, L. Calpurnius Piso, to encompass all of Achaea.233 Our primary
source on this incident is Cicero, and he is an extremely partisan one, but the direction of his rhetoric
applies itself directly to the status of Athens and must be considered. Cicero addresses Piso thus:234

You obtained a consular province with these limits, those which the law of your own desire had
attained, and not the law of your son-in-law; for from the superb and most just law of Caesar the
free people were wholly and truly free: however from this law which nobody beyond you and
your colleague thought a law, all of Achaia, Thessaly, Athens, and the whole of Greece have
been assigned to you.
In this passage, Cicero outright claims the assignment of Athens to the direct jurisdiction of a Roman
magistrate, and also suggests that the city possessed its liberty prior to 58 BCE. Claude Eilers has made
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the suggestion that we should dismiss this passage as hyperbolic rhetoric.235 However, there is strong
inscriptional evidence in support of the view that Roman magistrates transgressed the Athenian domestic
jurisdiction in 58 BCE. Specifically, an inscription of that year erected in Latin on Delos prescribes that
the island be free from taxation (“vecteigalibus leiberari”).236 Put this in contrast to Roman interventions
on Delos in the previous century, when the Roman Senate dealt with Delian affairs through the mediating
factor of the Athenian government. The extension of the Macedonian province to encompass Athens
expired with the tenure of Piso, and nominal independence returned to Athens, but the end was nigh.237
When Sulla captured Athens in 87 BCE, Plutarch tells us that he chose to spare the survivors
“…for the sake of the dead.”238 Of course, he was not referring to the dead then clustering the city’s
streets, but instead to the ancient prestige of Athens. The same sentiment would save the Athenians later
in the century, when the city fought alongside the Pompeian faction against Julius Caesar. We know
something of Athens’ contributions in this conflict from Caesar’s own account, which states that
“Pompeius assembled a great fleet from Asia, the Cycladic Islands… and Athens…”239 This register of
naval allies overwhelmingly consists of communities that were part of Pompey’s massive network of
informal clients.240 The Athenians would have likely had very little choice in making a contribution to the
Pompeian fleet, but the impetus to do so would have more likely sprung from their relationship with
Pompeius Magnus than from a piece of formal legislation such as the Clodian plebiscite. Later, in the
process of defeating Pompeius, Caesar captured Athens, and the words that Appian places in his mouth
echo those of Sulla forty years previously: “How many times will the reputation of your ancestors
preserve you who have been destroyed by your own deeds?”241 The Athenians of the first century BCE
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had long emphasized just that reputation in their interactions with the outside world with the language of
friendship, culture, and intellectualism. In these cases, the effect of that message was considerable
leniency in a period of cataclysmic warfare and destruction.
The formal and final annexation of Athens to the Roman provincial system would not occur until
27 BCE, but the death of Athens as a sovereign state occurred in its own words during the civil wars. In
chapter three, we considered Strabo’s claim that a confederation of Lycian-Greek cities ceased regulating
alliances with other states because they had lost the final say in their affairs to the Romans. The point, in
that instance, was not that the Romans had compelled them to this, but that it would be an inappropriate
use of the alliance (“συμμαχία”) as an institution of diplomacy. Allies properly construed were the
masters of their internal jurisdictions, and the loss of this deprived them of a credible claim to the title
“ally.” During the Roman civil wars, the Athenians suffered repeated violations of that internal
jurisdiction, their sovereignty, and correspondingly the term alliance disappears from their decrees. The
Ephebic formula that had traditionally referenced friends, allies, and, occasionally, Romans, appears for
the last time in the 40s BCE and, notably, honors the friends, the benefactors, and not a single ally.242 The
Athenians had ceased to be masters of their own affairs, and as such it was inappropriate to describe
themselves as possessing alliances.
At the same time, the Athenians continued to employ the rhetoric of friendship, benefaction, and
cultural prestige with tangible effects on the city’s political situation. Just as the antiquity of Masillia’s
friendship saved that city from destruction and terminal annexation, so also the Athenians’ informal
relations with Romans and their Republic had a constitutive effect on political events. Although the
Athenians still used this language, its frame of reference had begun to shift in the first century: the
historian Appian remarks in his history of the civil wars that the Athenians fought on only to determine

242

IG II2 1042: “ἐφ’ ὑ]γιείᾳ καὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆ[ς βουλῆς καὶ] [τοῦ δήμ]ου καὶ παίδων καὶ γυ[να]ικῶν καὶ τῶν φίλ[ων”

N o r t h | 66
the mastery of the Roman world.243 Language could still protect the Athenians, but its object had changed
from maintaining Athens’ status as an international actor to determining its place in a world of Romans.
The nature of Athenian rhetoric in relation to Roman power developed naturally and changed on its own
conditions: the meaning of alliance (“συμμαχία”) remained unchanged, and fell out of use when it became
a misnomer. Throughout the period of Rome’s advance into the east, this language protected the
Athenians and allowed them to exercise an authority disproportionate to their physical power or coercive
potential. In the second century, the Athenians carefully cultivated the friendship of Rome and through
this acquired Delos and numerous other islands in the Aegean. Twenty years prior to that, Athenian
diplomats used their status as a Roman friend to secure leniency for the Aetolian League. Finally, in the
first century, the memory of Athens, its friendship, and the image it cultivated saved the city from the
fires of civil war. This rhetoric, which we see reflected in Athenian inscriptions, preserved the city
through the last century of its freedom, and brought it securely to the start of a new age under the imperial
rule of Rome.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
At the height of the fifth century BCE the Athenian Empire was fast becoming the most
significant political actor in the eastern Mediterranean state system. While this potential collapsed with
Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE), it remained one of the most powerful states in
Greece until the Athenians’ defeat at the hands of Philip the Macedonian in 338 BCE. The period that
followed this resembled in many ways the relationship that the Athenians were later to assume with the
Romans under the empire, as Athenian politics came to center increasingly on individual relationships
with the Macedonian warlord of the moment. With the recession of Macedonian influence in the later
third century, the Athenians reasserted their status as an independent state in time to assume a prominent
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position as a friend and ally to the recently arrived Romans. This relationship benefitted the Athenians in
no small part because of the ability that Athenian diplomats showed in navigating the normative
expectations of contemporary diplomacy, as we see in the accounts of the historians. The language of the
Athenians themselves further reinforces the impression, as the use of the terms friendship and alliance in
inscriptions, when taken in concert with the historians, points to their efforts to represent themselves and
their state in the best possible manner in the face of Roman domination. This method of diplomacy, and
the positive self-representation that went with it, carried the Athenians safely through the volatile period
that marked Rome’s entrance to the east, and only failed it during the first century BCE as Roman
interests in the east evolved. Nevertheless, the memory of the relationship that the Athenians had with the
Romans, and the extreme cultural prestige attached to Athens, enabled the Athenians to pass onward to
the time of Imperial Rome.
The objective of this study has been to demonstrate the particular discursive norms that governed
the relationship between Athens and the Roman Republic and, through this, to argue that this language
had a constitutive effect on the fate of the Athenian state. Because the principal terms that are used to
describe the Romans in Athenian inscriptions are alliance (“συμμαχία”) and friendship (“φιλία”), I
selected these words and their variants as the primary units of analysis. In keeping with the intent to study
Athenian inscriptions as part of a larger discourse, it was necessary to then expand this range to cover the
parallel terms in the Latin language, which are partnership (“societas”) and friendship (“amicitia”). As we
saw in chapter three, the ancients’ parallel treatment of the first set of terms was not entirely accurate;
however, I have argued that this dissonance had a positive effect on the Athenians and their relations with
the Roman Republic. An interesting question for further study is, given that a semantic gap did exist
between alliance (“συμμαχία”) and partnership (“societas”), how did this distinction persist within a
discourse that included functionally bi-lingual figures? Although in some situations, such as that of the
Maccabees, the argument could be made that the author had little exposure to Roman diplomatic
procedure, we can say with certainty that the Athenians observed the workings of Roman governance first
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hand. I have attempted to provide a partial answer to this question in this study by showing what each
party had to gain from the preservation of distinctions in their language for alliance and partnership. In
essence, it enabled the Athenians to claim that they possessed a relationship of alliance with the Romans,
which implied concrete obligations to a Greek audience, while the Romans were able to develop all of the
benefits of a partnership (“societas”) with the Athenians without accumulating real obligations. This
worked for the Athenians because their interest in a relationship with the Romans lay at least as much
with the idea of alliance as it did with the practical manifestations of alliance. Provided that other Greeks
understood there to be an obliging alliance where there was in fact an informal partnership, the dissonant
relationship that the Athenians maintained with the Romans had immense propagandistic value.
Of equal importance to Athenian diplomacy was the institution of friendship as a fundamental
component of both ancient diplomacy and, more specifically, their relationship with the Romans. In
chapter four, we considered the effect of friendship on a variety of actors through the narrative accounts
of the historians. The Massalians, for instance, survived their decision to side with the Pompeian faction
in the civil wars on account of the antiquity of their friendship with the Romans. We observed a similar
dynamic in chapter five, when we considered the claims of Appian and Plutarch that the Roman warlords
Sulla and Caesar both preserved Athens out of respect for the Athenians’ forebears. The language of these
passages brings to light an interesting question in the context of this study because it seems clear in these
instances that the Athenians’ cultural prestige, as opposed to their mastery of political rhetoric, has saved
the day. In the previous chapter, we considered Rosillo-Lopez’ claim that there were two distinct periods
of Greek self-representation to Roman power. This claim would partition Greek self-representation into
an earlier period of political agency, in which Greek states represented themselves with the language and
expectations of political actors, and a later stage, in which marginalized Greek states developed their
discursive strategies around precisely the sort of cultural prestige that shielded the Athenians in the
aforementioned. Despite this, I hold that the results of this study caution us against the sharp partition of
Rosillo-Lopez. As we saw, the Athenians used the cultural prestige of philosophers such as Carneades
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from an early stage while, conversely, they continue to describe themselves in their inscriptions with a
political language relatively unchanged from that of Thucydides.
One of the major objectives of this project was to provide a case study in support of the
International Relations (IR) Constructivist thesis for the ancient Mediterranean state system. The impetus
for this was the concern on the part of the author that the claims of the competing (IR) Realist school, as
exemplified in the work of Arthur Eckstein, represent a substantial and concerning challenge to our
understanding of the Greco-Roman world. The basis of this concern is what I presented in chapter two as
the unitary actor problem, one of the implications arising from (IR) Realism’s emphasis on system-level
factors. This has the effect, as we have seen, of suggesting that the individual features of actors,
discursive or otherwise, have a finite or non-existent capacity to influence the international system,
which, according to Eckstein, revolves primarily around generalized security concerns. The story of this
study has been of a small state with limited coercive potential, but also one with an exceptional ability to
harness ideas to its favor. In some instances, such as in the closing moments of the first century BCE, this
amounted to an appeal to a specific feature of the Athenian state, namely their historical prestige. In other
moments, however, the Athenians appealed to a common set of expectations enshrined in the institutions
of friendship, alliance, and the surrounding terms. The success that they, and other actors previously
discussed, had in this endeavor points to both the existence of norms of international conduct in the
ancient world and the capacity of those norms to constitute the behavior of actors. The Athenians
survived to enter Roman subjugation not because of the cold realities of their world, but because of their
ability to exercise normative diplomacy and cultural prestige in spite of those realities.
It is a dangerous proposition to diagnose the behavior of actors under any circumstance, and even
more so for historians of the ancient world operating with a paucity of evidence derived for the most part
from biased or misinformed elite sources. Because of this, I would avoid the claim that this study has
fully achieved its objective of explaining the Athenians’ relationship with the Romans, which is, after all,
impossible given the restrictions of our evidence. Instead, I would assert that this research points to
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aspects of Athenian behavior that, while we can’t always explain their internal significance, had a
substantial impact on the overall course of Athenian history. It is with some awe that I recognize that this
research has attempted to shed light on an area of study that has undergone consideration and revision
since the birth of the field, but it is also my hope that the reader will conclude with the view that we still
have much to learn through fresh frameworks such as Constructivism. The chief claim of the (IR)
Constructivist with respect to classical antiquity is a simple one: that the language and specific
characteristics of even the smallest actors had the capacity to tangibly effect the system of states that they
belonged to. It is often the case in the study of this period that we must follow the light of our sources,
and this is a path that will often lead to Athens. This is, in fact, beneficial for the purposes of this study,
for the voice that rings down this trail from the depths of antiquity is that of a small city in Attica that
tried the test of time to its final reckoning with only ideas to carry it forward.
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